Foreword
The Secure Controls Framework Council (SCF Council) established a cohesive, consistent set of standards for performing security, compliance and resilience-related Third-Party Assessment, Attestation and Certification Services (3PAAC Services). By following the Cybersecurity & Data Protection Assessment Standards (CDPAS) approach, security, compliance and resilience practitioners can improve the currently disjointed approach used to perform assessments of cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
The CDPAS is a “standard” that normalizes third-party assessment practices. Per NIST, a standard is “a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, which provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context.”
Assessment vs. Audit
In compliance-related matters, it is important to note that words have specific meanings. The CDPAS focuses on third-party assessments, not internal or external audits. The terms “audit” and “assessment” are not interchangeable, since each has a unique meaning. Assessment: The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for an information system or organization. Audit: The independent examination of records and activities to ensure compliance with established controls, policy and operational procedures and to recommend any indicated changes in controls, policy, or procedures.
In addition to performing an assessment, 3PAAC Services embody the concepts of attestation and certification:
- Attestation: The issue of a statement, based on a decision, that fulfillment of specified requirements has been demonstrated.
- Certification: The process of verifying the correctness of a statement or claim and issuing a certificate as to its correctness.
As part of 3PAAC Services, a Third-Party Assessment Organization (3PAO) is expected to:
- Conduct an assessment of applicable cybersecurity and/or data protection controls within an assessment boundary;
- Provide an attestation based on the findings from the controls assessment in a Report on Conformity (ROC); and
- Finalize the process by authorizing the issue of a certification, if sufficient conformity is achieved.
Intended Audience, Purpose & Intent
Intended Audience
The intended audience of the CDPAS is those parties encompassing the “assessment ecosystem,” which includes:
- Organization Seeking Assessment (OSA);
- 3PAOs;
- Assessors; and
- External Service Providers (ESP):
- Consultants;
- Cloud Service Providers (CSP);
- Managed Service Providers (MSP); and
- Managed Security Services Providers (MSSP).
Purpose
The CDPAS exists to provide performance standards for security, compliance and resilience-related 3PAAC Services.
Intent
The CDPAS is not “one-size-fits-all.” Instead, the guidance throughout this document should be adopted and tailored to the unique size, resources and risk circumstances of each OSA and 3PAO.
The CDPAS can be modified, or augmented, with OSA-specific requirements, policies, or other compliance obligations due to statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements. This publication empowers OSAs to develop security, compliance and resilience assessment strategies tailored to their specific mission, business needs, threats and operational environments.
Prohibitions
The following usages of this content are strictly prohibited:
- Use without proper attribution to the SCF Council;
- Training Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies; and/or
- Use as part of an AI dataset or any other AI-related activities.
Liability Limitations
THIS CONTENT IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONTENT OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE CONTENT.
Submit comments on this publication to: comments@securecontrolsframework.com
Terminology & Acronyms
The SCF Council recognizes two (2) primary sources for authoritative definitions for security, compliance and resilience terminology:
- The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) IR 7298, Glossary of Key Cybersecurity Terms, is the approved reference document used to define cybersecurity-related terminology; and
- NIST Glossary.
From the context of applying a standard to 3PAAC Services, it is important to clarify mandatory versus optional criteria:
Shall & Shall Not
The terms “SHALL” and “SHALL NOT” indicate requirements:
- To be followed strictly in order to conform; and
- From which no deviation is permitted.
Should & Should Not
The terms “SHOULD” and “SHOULD NOT” indicate that:
- Among several possibilities one (1) is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others;
- A certain course of action is preferred, but not necessarily required; or
- A certain possibility, or course of action, is discouraged, but not prohibited.
May & Need Not
The terms “MAY” and “NEED NOT” indicate a course of action permissible within reasonable limits.
Can & Cannot
The terms “CAN” and “CANNOT” indicate:
- A possibility and capability; or
- The absence of that possibility or capability.
Terminology Standardization
Within the cybersecurity profession, the term “control” can be applied to a variety of contexts and can serve multiple purposes. When used in the CDPAS context, a control is a mechanism (e.g., a safeguard or countermeasure) designed to address protection needs specified by security requirements.
- Controls are:
- The power to make decisions about how something is managed or how something is done;
- The ability to direct the actions of someone or something;
- An action, method or law that limits; and/or
- A device or mechanism used to regulate or guide the operation of a machine, apparatus or system.
- Requirements are statements that translate, or express, a need and its associated constraints and conditions.
Definitions & Acronyms
The CDPAS defines the assessment-relevant terms it uses, from Adequate Security to Trust, and includes a full list of acronyms. Both lists are in the CDPAS PDF.
How Is The CDPAS Organized?
The CDPAS has nine standards, each broken into numbered sub-standards. Every sub-standard states the requirement, a justification for why it exists and guidance on how to meet it.
Professional Duty of Care
Standard Requirement
Assessors must exercise due diligence and due care by using their skills and knowledge to reach informed, objective decisions when conducting Third-Party Assessment, Attestation & Certification Services (3PAAC Services).
Justification
Assessors and Third-Party Assessment Organizations (3PAOs) operate in a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors and 3PAOs must exercise due diligence and due care in the conduct of their business interactions and representation of professionalism in business interactions.
Guidance
There is a professional obligation for cybersecurity and/or data privacy practitioners to provide reasonable services and skills to their clients. 3PAOs and assessors are expected to be familiar with the industry norms associated with client 3PAAC Service engagements, due to the specialized knowledge that may be required as part of the assessment.
Standard 1 - Sub-Requirements
Ethical Conduct
Assessors must:
- Act ethically, professionally and legally towards clients, employers, colleagues and society; and
- Adhere to ethical principles and values in personal and professional endeavors, specifically being honest, forthright and trustworthy.
Justification
Assessors operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors are expected to conduct themselves professionally. Unprofessional conduct can harm the 3PAO and the Organization Seeking Assessment (OSA).
Guidance
Organizations providing 3PAAC Services are reasonably expected to have formalized standards of conduct (e.g., rules of behavior) that their employees and contractors are contractually obligated to adhere to. Those documented standards of conduct can help define an assessor's formal role and responsibilities. Violations of those standards of conduct are expected to be addressed through Human Resources (HR)-related enforcement mechanisms that includes personnel sanctions. HR enforcement actions are expected to reflect the severity of the conduct violation.
Independence
Assessors must maintain objectivity and be free to exercise professional judgment.
Justification
Assessors operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors must operate independently and exercise professional judgment without bias or influence. Without assessor independence:
- The integrity of the assessment should be considered compromised; and
- Any final report or related observations should be dismissed as untrustworthy, requiring a re-assessment by a different 3PAO.
Guidance
Ensuring assessor independence may be achieved through:
- Avoiding Conflicts of Interest (COI);
- Sound hiring practices; and
- Top-down evaluations to uncover dysfunctional management practices.
Subject Matter Competency
Assessors must:
- Have documented evidence of relevant job experience and relevant training to demonstrate proficiency in performing assessment duties; and
- Annually, complete at least twenty (20) hours of Continuing Professional Education (CPE) training in topics relevant to the skills and situational awareness necessary to be an effective assessor.
Justification
It is reasonable to expect an assessor to be a demonstrable Subject Matter Expert (SME) in cybersecurity and/or data protection practices. Being able to demonstrate this will be through relevant, ongoing skill development:
- Industry-recognized cybersecurity and/or data privacy certifications;
- Industry involvement (e.g., conference panels); and
- Other training opportunities (e.g., online or in-person training events).
Guidance
It is possible to complete the annual CPE requirements concurrently with other professional certifications. While it is impossible to have expertise in every highly technical subcategory of the cybersecurity profession, it is reasonable to expect that an assessment team will bring in Assessment Technical Experts (ATE), with subject matters expertise to conduct their specific part of an assessment, as necessary. 3PAOs should leverage NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, for guidance on specialized technical assessments, including:
- Application security testing and examination; and
- Remote access testing.
The US Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 8140.03, Cybersecurity Workforce Qualification and Management Program, contains a listing of industry certifications for various cybersecurity-related positions. The Security Control Assessor (role ID# 612) from DODM 8140.3 provides an industry standard for minimum certifications that is applicable to:
- Entry-level assessor;
- Intermediate-level assessor; and
- Senior-level assessor.
In addition to practical, hands-on experience, this DODM guidance should be used by 3PAOs to establish a baseline level of subject matter competency necessary to perform 3PAAC Services:
- Entry and intermediate-level assessor:
- An undergraduate (Bachelor of Science) degree fulfills the educational requirement if it is:
- From an: Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) accredited; or Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) designated institution.
- In one of the following degrees: Information Technology (IT); Cybersecurity; Data Science; Information Systems; or Computer Science (CS); and/or
- One (1) of the following certifications:
- CGRC/CAP: ISACA Certified in Governance, Risk, and Compliance (formerly known as CAP);
- GSEC: GIAC Security Essentials Certification;
- CASP+: CompTIA Advanced Security Practitioner plus;
- Cloud+: CompTIA Cloud plus;
- PenTest+: CompTIA Penetration Tester plus; and/or
- Security+: CompTIA Security plus.
- Senior-level assessor:
- An undergraduate degree fulfills the educational requirement if it is:
- From an: Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) accredited; or Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) designated institution.
- In one of the following degrees: Information Technology (IT); Cybersecurity; Data Science; Information Systems; or Computer Science (CS); and/or
- One (1) of the following certifications:
- CISM: ISACA Certified Information Security Manager;
- CISA: ISACA Certified Information Systems Auditor;
- CISSP: ISC2 Certified Information Systems Security Professional;
- CISSP-ISSEP: ISC2 CISSP Information Systems Security Engineering Professional;
- GCSA: GIAC Cloud Security Automation;
- GSLC: GIAC Security Leadership Certification;
- GSNA: GIAC Systems and Network Auditor;
- CySA+: CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst plus;
- C)ISSO: Certified Information Systems Security Officer;
- C)PTE: Certified Penetration Testing Engineer; and/or
- FITSP-A: Federal IT Security Professional-Auditor.
Conflict of Interest (COI) Avoidance
Assessors must avoid actual and/or perceived COI. COI includes involvement in the design, or implementation, of any of the OSA’s cybersecurity and/or data protection controls, which are reasonably expected, or intended, to be included in the scope of the assessment:
- An assessor is prohibited from conducting 3PAAC Services if the assessor made a material impact on the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program; and
- Materiality impact is defined as:
- Material Impact: Within the past five (5) years, the assessor made a significant impact on the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program, where the assessor performed a broad scope of work with a strategic and/or operational impact on the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls; and
- Non-Material Impact: Within the past two (2) years, the assessor made no greater than a minor impact on the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program, where the assessor performed a limited scope of work with minimal impact on tactical-focused cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
Justification
Assessors operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, the integrity of an assessor must be sufficiently independent of the OSA and maintain the ability to conclude on the design and operational quality of the controls assessed without bias from prior knowledge of the OSA’s cybersecurity and privacy control structure. An actual or perceived COI devalues an assessor's integrity. In a worst-case scenario, when there is an actual COI, the assessment results could be considered fraud if the assessor benefits from the activity.
Guidance
Avoiding COI may be achieved through:
- Being aware of what constitutes a material and non-material impact; and
- Due diligence practices for assessment team participation reviews.
Secure Practices
Standard Requirement
3PAOs must identify potential assessment-related threats and implement ways to minimize and/or mitigate those associated risks.
Justification
Assessors and 3PAOs must be capable of protecting data at a level equivalent to the assessed environment. This requires the assessors and 3PAOs to proactively identify relevant threats and implement appropriate cybersecurity and/or data protection controls to minimize risk to the 3PAO and OSA.
Guidance
The 3PAO is expected to define and implement pertinent cybersecurity and/or data protection controls required by applicable laws, regulations, contractual obligations and industry norms.
Standard 2 - Sub-Requirements
Security & Data Protection By Design & By Default
3PAOs must implement security and data protection by design and by default principles for governing:
- Administrative processes;
- Technology selection and architectural decisions;
- Physical security practices; and
- The protection of sensitive and/or regulated data throughout the information lifecycle.
Justification
Cybersecurity and data protection practices need to be “baked in” as compared to “bolted on” a 3PAO’s day-to-day practices. This is the concept of security, compliance and resilience practices being consciously “designed and implemented” to ensure secure and compliant practices are operationalized across system and information lifecycles.
Guidance
The Secure Controls Framework (SCF) has Security, Compliance & Resilience (SCR) Principles that 3PAOs can leverage. The term “sensitive data” includes, but is not limited to:
- Personal Data (PD):
- Full name;
- Date of birth;
- Email address;
- Phone number;
- IP address;
- Place of birth; and
- Employment information.
- Non-precise geographical data (e.g., ZIP code, city, state, country, etc.).
- Sensitive Personal Data (sPD):
- Government-issued ID information (e.g., driver’s license, passport, Social Security number (SSN), etc.);
- Information that allows account access:
- Account log-in, financial account, debit card or credit card number in combination with:
- Any required security or access code, password or credentials allowing access.
- Precise geolocation data;
- Race or ethnicity;
- Citizenship or immigration status;
- Religious or philosophical beliefs;
- Trade union membership;
- Genetic data;
- Biometric data;
- Health-related data;
- Data concerning a person's sex life or sexual orientation;
- Contents of a data subject’s communications (e.g., email and/or text messages) unless the data processor is the intended recipient of the communication;
- Attorney-Client Privilege Information (ACPI); and
- Cardholder Data (CHD).
- Intellectual Property (IP):
- Patents;
- Trade secrets;
- Trademarks; and
- Copyrights.
- Regulated data:
- Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI);
- Federal Contract Information (FCI);
- Export-Controlled Data (ITAR / EAR);
- Protected Health Information (PHI);
- Student Educational Records (FERPA); and
- Critical Infrastructure Information (CII).
Statement of Work
(SOW)
3PAOs must formalize an agreement detailing the scope, nature and extent of the assessment that includes the following:
- The type of assessment to be performed, inclusive of control testing procedures;
- The assessment boundary;
- The timeline for completing each stage of work, inclusive of review and report finalization details; and
- Where remediation and reassessment are necessary, the reassessment stage.
Justification
A formal contract is reasonably expected to detail the nature of the work and milestones.
Guidance
3PAOs are expected to have formal onboarding processes for an OSA. This may include multiple types of agreements, in addition to a SOW:
- Master Services Agreement (MSA);
- Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs); and
- Change Orders.
Assessment-Specific Data Protection Impact Assessment
(DPIA)
3PAOs must perform a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) to cover the types of sensitive and/or regulated data that is reasonably expected to be stored, processed and/or transmitted throughout the lifecycle of the assessment.
Justification
A DPIA is designed to systematically analyze, identify and mitigate data protection risks associated with a project or initiative. A DPIA:
- Can be used for more than data protection considerations; and
- Applies to multiple types of sensitive and/or regulated data.
Guidance
Assessments should be considered discrete projects with unique data protection requirements. To understand data handling requirements, a DPIA should be performed prior to initiating any 3PAAC Services.
Intellectual Property (IP) Protections
3PAOs must take all reasonable precautions to protect the confidentiality of all OSA Intellectual Property (IP) the assessment team is exposed to during the assessment lifecycle.
Justification
Assessors and 3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors and 3PAOs are expected to protect IP with all reasonable technical, administrative and physical controls necessary.
Guidance
The 3PAO should implement a process to identify IP types that the assessment team will reasonably be exposed to. Ideally, specific systems/applications/networks containing sensitive information should be documented for awareness by the assessment team.
Protection of Assessment Information
3PAOs must implement reasonable technical, administrative and physical controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of assessment information throughout the lifecycle of the assessment.
Justification
Assessors and 3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors and 3PAOs are expected to protect assessment-related data with all reasonable technical, administrative and physical controls necessary for the entire lifecycle of the assessment data.
Guidance
The 3PAO is expected to govern its cybersecurity and/or data protection controls to protect assessment-related information. At a minimum, these reasonable controls should adhere to the applicable laws, regulations, contractual obligations and industry norms for security, compliance and resilience protections.
3PAOs should leverage NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, for guidance on security assessment related:
- Data handling:
- Data collection;
- Data storage;
- Data transmission; and
- Data destruction; and
- Post-testing activities:
- Mitigating recommendations;
- Reporting; and
- Remediation/mitigation.
Use of Assessment Information
3PAOs are prohibited from using information obtained during an assessment for any purpose not:
- Explicitly authorized by the OSA; and
- Included in the MSA or SOW.
Justification
Assessors and 3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors and 3PAOs are expected to use the collected information only for the assessment's stated purpose(s).
Guidance
The MSA/SOW and DPIA should clearly define permissible uses of assessment information, including any limitations on data sharing and requirements for data anonymization. Explicit clauses should prohibit using data for purposes outside the agreed scope.
Disposal of Assessment Information
3PAOs must:
- Satisfy statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations for data retention;
- Adhere to a formal data retention schedule; and
- Securely dispose of assessment information, once the minimum retention period is achieved.
Justification
3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, 3PAOs are expected to securely dispose of assessment-related data once the data retention period is met, as agreed to in the SOW and/or MSA.
Guidance
For assessments not involving sensitive and/or regulated data, or an OSA with specific retention requirements, it is reasonable for a 3PAO to maintain an OSA’s assessment data for no less than three (3) years. For regulated OSAs, suggestions are as follows:
- Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires Covered Entities (CEs) and Business Associates (BAs) to retain certain documents for a minimum of six (6) years;
- Accounting and assessment firms generally follow the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and US-based tax authority guidance of seven (7) years; and
- The rule for Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) requires CMMC Third-Party Assessment Organizations (CSCF 3PAOs) to retain assessment-related information for a minimum of six (6) years.
Based on the DPIA and contractual obligations as part of the assessment, the 3PAO may have unique retention requirements for assessment findings. Each assessment must have a discrete and secure storage location, with the capability to manually, or automatically, purge assessment information once the data retention period is met.
Sampling Methodology
3PAOs must define the specific sampling methodology used to perform 3PAAC Services. Acceptable sampling methods include:
- Statistical; or
- Nonstatistical.
Justification
3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, 3PAOs are expected to be able to explain the methods used to determine sufficient sampling in order to defend its assessment findings against People, Processes, Technologies, Data and Facilities (PPTDF).
Guidance
Statistical sampling uses random selection to draw conclusions about a population, while non-statistical sampling uses judgment to select a sample:
- Statistical sampling includes, but is not limited to:
- Random selection (e.g., random number generators); and
- Linear systematic sampling; and
- Circular systematic sampling.
- Nonstatistical sampling includes, but is not limited to:
- Haphazard sampling;
- Judgement sampling; and
- Block sampling.
For industry references:
- NIST SP 800-53A: Provides guidelines for assessing the effectiveness of security controls. It includes specific procedures for evidence collection and analysis (e.g., examine, interview and test).
- NIST SP 800-115: Offers technical information security testing and assessment guidelines, including evidence sampling techniques.
The sampling methodology should be able to address the following questions:
- What question is being answered? (e.g., underlying rationale for collecting the evidence).
- What data elements are being collected?
- Is the data element continuous or discrete?
- Continuous data is data that can take any value within a given range and can be measured with increasing precision; and
- Discrete data is data that can only take on specific, separate values, often whole numbers, and cannot be subdivided or measured.
- Who will be performing the data collection?
- What is the source and format of the data?
- Are there related conditions to record? (e.g., other information that should be recorded to understand or explain the data).
- How frequently will the data be collected, if more than one (1) iteration of sampling is performed?
- What steps are used to eliminate bias to protect the integrity of the data collection?
- How the data will be displayed once it is collected and analyzed?
Within cybersecurity assessments, haphazard sampling is commonly used where an assessor makes a random selection without bias or any specific reason to include or omit from the sample population. This requires looking at evidence populations according to:
- Standardized; or
- Non-Standardized
To help explain the differences between a standardized vs a non-standardized population:
- Technology assets (e.g., servers, routers, switches, laptops, etc.) are likely built according to an organization-approved hardening standard. This creates a standardized population, where configurations can be quickly assessed at scale with appropriate tools.
- Processes (e.g., risk assessments, onboarding/offboarding actions, etc.) should follow standardized procedures. Mature processes form a standardized population, where practices can be assessed against a documented procedure.
- Data (e.g., PII, CHD, CUI, ePHI, etc.) should be properly categorized/classified. Managed data sets form a standardized population, where data can be assessed at scale with appropriate tools (assuming it is properly categorized).
- People (e.g., employees, contractors, etc.) are unique, where you may have various work schedules, assigned work locations, etc. People form a non-standardized population, where a sample size may need to be larger than a standardized sample size, due to a lack of standardization.
- Facilities (e.g., offices, warehouses, data centers, franchise locations, etc.) are often unique, based on geographic location and the physical footprint an operation may be forced to conform to. Similar to people, facilities form a non-standardized population, where a sample size may need to be larger than a standardized sample size, due to a lack of standardization.
From a PPTDF perspective, the CDPAS guidance on haphazard sampling is:
Standardized Population (Process, Technology or Data)
- ≥ 100: 5% or 20 (smaller of the two values)
- 21 to 99: 5%
- ≤ 20: 10%
Non-Standardized Population (People or Facilities)
- ≥ 100: 2% or 10 (larger of the two values)
- 21 to 99: 10% or 3 (larger of the two values)
- ≤ 20: 30% or 1 (larger of the two values)
There are four (4) factors that impact sample sizes:
- Data type. Discrete data requires larger sample sizes than continuous data.
- Required confidence level. The sample size requirement increases as confidence level increases.
- Margin of error. The sample size requirement increases as margin of error decreases.
- Variation in the population or process. The sample size requirement increases as standard deviation or proportion increases.
Due Diligence (OSAs)
Standard Requirement
OSA must:
- Identify, document and remediate risks in accordance with the OSA’s documented risk management practices;
- Perform due diligence activities in preparation for an assessment;
- Document these activities as part of the OSA’s assessment planning process; and
- Demonstrate evidence of assessment readiness to a 3PAO for 3PAAC Services.
Justification
The OSA has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Being unprepared to engage with a 3PAO for 3PAAC Services is fiscally irresponsible, since 3PAAC Services are costly and the likelihood of a successful assessment without evidence of due diligence is remote.
Guidance
OSAs can use ISO 27005 or NIST SP 800-37 for guidance on implementing and maintaining its risk management practices.
OSAs should treat assessments as discrete projects. This proper resourcing and governance can help an OSA perform and document due diligence activities.
The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) defines the lifecycle of security, compliance and resilience controls. The RMF consists of seven (7) unique phases that cover the lifecycle of controls governance:
- Prepare. Essential activities to prepare the OSA to manage cybersecurity and privacy risks;
- Categorize. Categorize systems, applications, services and data based on an impact analysis;
- Select. Select appropriate security, compliance and resilience controls to protect PPTDF based on risk assessments;
- Implement. Implement security, compliance and resilience controls and document how those controls are deployed;
- Assess. Assess to determine if the security, compliance and resilience controls are in place, operating as intended, and producing the desired results;
- Authorize. A senior OSA official (e.g., manager, director, officer, etc.) makes a risk-based decision to authorize the system, application, service or project to operate in a production environment; and
- Monitor. Continuously monitor:
- Cybersecurity and data protection control implementation; and
- Evolving risks and threats.
In the context of 3PAAC Services, OSAs should expect a 3PAO to ask reasonable questions pertaining to the following governance topics:
- How the OSA performs due diligence and due care activities for security, compliance and resilience obligations;
- How the OSA’s systems/processes/services/data are categorized;
- The reasoning for the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience controls that were selected;
- How the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience controls were implemented;
- The method the OSA used to assess security, compliance and resilience controls, prior to systems/services/applications going into production; and
- The OSA’s ongoing monitoring practices to determine:
- Cybersecurity & data protection control effectiveness; and
- Awareness of evolving risks and threats.
Standard 3 - Sub-Requirements
Adherence To Data Protection Requirements
OSA must adhere to all applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations to protect sensitive and/or regulated data during 3PAAC Services.
Justification
Providing access to specific systems, applications, services and/or data may not be authorized, due to existing data protection practice requirements (e.g., privacy notice, data sharing agreements, etc.).
Guidance
OSAs should perform a DPIA to identify the types of data processed and their sensitivity levels and help systematically identify, analyze and mitigate data protection risks associated with 3PAAC Services. The DPIA should be performed before initiating any 3PAAC Services to understand potential limitations on assessor access to systems, applications, services and/or data.
Assessment Boundary Demarcation
OSA must:
- Establish the scope of the assessment by defining the assessment boundary demarcation as:
- Organization-wide;
- A specific contract, project or initiative;
- A specific Business Unit (BU) within an organization; or
- A specific country, or geographic region, of the organization’s business operations; and
- If applicable, identifying relevant third-parties that make up the assessment boundary.
Justification
The OSA is ultimately responsible for conducting the due diligence to define the assessment boundary demarcation. This fundamental step influences the SOW for 3PAAC Services.
Guidance
To define the demarcation of the assessment boundary:
- For an organization-wide scope, it is defined by a discrete:
- Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN);
- Employer Identification Number (EIN);
- Value Added Tax (VAT);
- Dun & Bradstreet Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS); or
- If applicable, a Commercial And Government Entity (CAGE) Code.
- For a contract, project, product or initiative, it is defined by:
- Sufficient detail to describe the scope of the assessment boundary:
- People;
- Processes;
- Technologies;
- Data; and
- Facilities;
- Contract number and/or the name of the project or initiative; and
- If applicable, a CAGE Code that is associated with the contract.
- For a BU, country or geographic region, it is defined by:
- Sufficient detail to describe the scope of the assessment boundary:
- People;
- Processes;
- Technologies;
- Data; and
- Facilities;
- OSA-designated name for the BU, country(ies) or geographic region; and
- If applicable, a CAGE Code that is associated with the BU.
Graphical Representation of Assessment Boundary
OSA must generate a graphical representation of the assessment boundary to ensure control applicability is appropriately determined for systems, applications, services and third-parties that:
- Reflects the current architecture of the network environment(s);
- Clearly represents network access points on the perimeter of the network(s);
- Documents all sensitive and/or regulated data flows; and
- Contains sufficient detail to assess the applicable cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
Justification
Graphically representing the assessment boundary helps:
- Prevent miscommunication among stakeholders by providing a clear visual delineation of which systems, data and processes are included within the scope; and
- Ensure comprehensive coverage by reducing errors in scoping and including all relevant elements during the assessment.
Guidance
A graphical representation of the assessment boundary can be in the form of a network diagram.
Stakeholder Identification
OSA must clearly define applicable internal and third-party assessment stakeholders.
Justification
Identifying the applicable internal and external stakeholders is crucial to any assessment-related due diligence. Developing a trust relationship with key stakeholders is also essential for a successful assessment.
Guidance
Stakeholder identification can be achieved through documenting a Responsible, Accountable, Supportive, Consulted & Informed (RASCI) matrix:
- Responsible: entity directly responsible for performing a task (e.g., control/process operator);
- Accountable: entity overall responsible for the task being performed and has the authority to delegate the task to others (e.g., control/process owner);
- Supportive: entity(ies) under the coordination of the Responsible person for support in performing the task;
- Consulted: entity(ies) not directly involved in task execution but were consulted for subject matter expertise; and
- Informed: entity(ies) not involved in task execution but are informed when the task is completed.
Control Reciprocity
For control reciprocity:
- The sole authority to determine control reciprocity is the:
- Certification scheme owner; or
- Applicable Accreditation Body (AB); and
- If a control reciprocity exists:
- OSA must identify the specific controls it seeks reciprocity for; and
- Applicable controls identified for reciprocity must share the same assessment boundary(ies).
Justification
Control reciprocity decisions involve an analysis to determine applicability, which is solely up to the discretion of an authoritative body to make the determination. OSA, assessor and/or 3PAO opinions do not matter in control reciprocity decisions, since they are non-authoritative.
Guidance
For properly scoped and applicable controls, 3PAOs are required to accept the reciprocity decision from the authoritative body.
Control reciprocity decisions are rarely straightforward, due to the nature of crosswalk mapping between different frameworks. Clarification should be sought from the relevant authoritative body for answers to specific reciprocity questions.
Example 1: Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC)
- An OSA with a current and valid CMMC Level 2 certification would be able to demonstrate conformity with:
- Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) controls in NIST SP 800-171 R2; and
- Federal Contract Information (FCI) controls in FAR 52.204-21 and NIST SP 800-171 R2.
- While the OSA would be able to demonstrate compliance with CUI and FCI controls, it would not be able to demonstrate conformity with broader compliance obligations for:
- DFARS 252.204-7012 (e.g., incident reporting requirements); and/or
- Non-Federal Organization (NFO) controls from NIST SP 800-171 R2.
Example 2: FedRAMP
- A current and valid FedRAMP certification would allow an OSA to demonstrate conformity with applicable NIST SP 800-53 in the FedRAMP Cloud Service Provider (CSP) environment.
- The OSA would not be able to use that same FedRAMP certification to demonstrate conformity with applicable NIST SP 800-53 controls outside of the FedRAMP CSP environment.
Example 3: ISO/IEC 27001
- A current and valid ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification would allow an OSA to demonstrate conformity with applicable ISO/IEC 27001:2022 controls within the scope of the ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification.
- The OSA would not be able to use that same ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification to demonstrate conformity with controls outside of the scope of the ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification.
Control Inheritance
To claim control inheritance:
- From the External Services Provider (ESP) the OSA is seeking control inheritance, OSA must obtain evidence in the form of a:
- First-Party Declaration (1PD); or
- Third-Party Attestation (3PA);
- OSA must identify the specific controls it seeks control inheritance for;
- Applicable controls identified for control inheritance must share the same assessment boundary(ies); and
- The ESP’s service(s) claiming control inheritance must be documented in:
- A contract between the OSA and ESP; and
- A RASCI matrix, or similar form of customer responsibility matrix, that clearly identifies applicable roles and responsibilities associated with inherited controls.
Justification
It is reasonable to assume that OSAs will have external support and/or services, which requires the evaluation of inherited controls.
Guidance
It is at the 3PAO’s discretion to perform limited or in-depth control testing to validate control inheritance.
Example 1: Service Organization Control (SOC) 2 Type 2
- An OSA could leverage an ESP’s Service Organization Control (SOC) 2 Type 2 report to address physical security of data center assets.
- The OSA would not be able to leverage that same SOC 2 Type 2 report for the OSA’s on-premises physical security.
Example 2: Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC)
- An OSA with a current and valid CMMC Level 2 certification would be able to demonstrate conformity with:
- Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) controls in NIST SP 800-171 R2; and
- Federal Contract Information (FCI) controls in FAR 52.204-21 and NIST SP 800-171 R2.
- While the OSA would be able to demonstrate compliance with CUI and FCI controls, it would not be able to demonstrate conformity with broader compliance obligations for:
- DFARS 252.204-7012 (e.g., incident reporting requirements); and/or
- Non-Federal Organization (NFO) controls from NIST SP 800-171 R2.
Statement of Applicability (SoA): Defined Cybersecurity and/or Data Privacy Controls
OSA must define a Statement of Applicability (SoA) that identifies applicable cybersecurity and/or data protection controls that apply to the organization.
Justification
The OSA is ultimately responsible for conducting the due diligence to define the applicable cybersecurity and/or data protection controls for the assessment. This fundamental step influences the SOW for 3PAAC Services.
Guidance
The SCF’s Integrated Controls Management (ICM) Model provides guidance on how to properly define applicable controls. The ICM focuses on the need to understand and clarify the difference between "compliant" versus "secure" since the distinction is necessary to have coherent risk management discussions. To assist in this process, an organization’s applicable controls can be categorized according to “must have” vs “nice to have” requirements:
- Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) are the absolute minimum requirements that must be addressed to comply with applicable laws, regulations and contracts. MCR are primarily externally-influenced, based on industry, government, state and local regulations. MCR should never imply adequacy for secure practices and data protection, since they are merely compliance-related.
- Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) are tied to the organization’s risk appetite since DSR are “above and beyond” MCR, where the organization self-identifies additional cybersecurity and/or data protection controls to address voluntary industry practices or internal requirements, such as findings from internal audits or risk assessments. DSR are primarily internally-influenced, based on the organization’s respective industry and risk tolerance. While MCR establish the foundational floor that must be adhered to, DSR are where organizations often achieve improved efficiency, automation and enhanced security.
The combination of MCR and DSR equate to an organization’s Minimum Security Requirements (MSR), which define the “must have” and “nice to have” requirements for PPTDF in one control set. It describes the Minimum Viable Product (MVP) technical and business requirements from a security, compliance and resilience perspective. In short, the MSR can be considered an organization’s IT General Controls (ITGC), which establishes the basic controls that must be applied to systems, applications, services, processes and data throughout the enterprise. ITGC provide the foundation of assurance for an organization’s decision makers. ITGC enables an organization’s governance function to define how technologies are designed, implemented and operated.
Defined Risk Tolerance
OSA must define their organizational risk tolerance as one (1) of the five (5) following levels:
- Low;
- Moderate;
- High;
- Severe; or
- Extreme.
Justification
Defined risk tolerance provides criteria to assess an OSA’s risk management practices. An organization's risk tolerance is influenced by several factors that includes, but is not limited to:
- Statutory, regulatory and contractual compliance obligations (including adherence to privacy principles for ethical data protection practices);
- Organization-specific threats (natural and manmade);
- Reasonably expected industry practices;
- Pressure from competition; and
- Executive management decisions (e.g., Board of Directors).
Guidance
See Appendix B: Risk Terminology Normalization for context and examples for determining the appropriate risk tolerance for an organization.
Defined Maturity Level
OSA must define the current and targeted level of maturity of its cybersecurity and/or data protection program as one (1) of the following six (6) designations:
- Level 0: Not Performed;
- Level 1: Performed Informally;
- Level 2: Planned & Tracked;
- Level 3: Well-Defined;
- Level 4: Quantitatively-Controlled; or
- Level 5: Continuously Improving.
Justification
The intended usage of maturity is meant to provide relevant context, as it pertains to control implementation and operations. Different evaluation criteria would be reasonably expected for each level of maturity.
Guidance
The CDPAS leverages the maturity levels from the SCF’s Secure, Compliant & Resilient Capability Maturity Model (SCR-CMM):
- Level 0 Maturity: Not Performed. This level of maturity is defined as “non-existence practices,” where the control is not being performed:
- Practices are non-existent, where a reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
- Evidence of due care and due diligence do not exist to demonstrate compliance with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.
- Level 1 Maturity: Performed Informally. This level of maturity is defined as “ad hoc practices,” where the control is being performed, but lacks completeness & consistency:
- Practices are “ad hoc” where the intent of a control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
- When the control is met, it lacks consistency and formality (e.g., rudimentary practices are performed informally).
- A reasonable person would conclude the control is not consistently performed in a structured manner.
- Performance depends on the specific knowledge and effort of the individual performing the task(s), where the performance of these practices is not proactively governed.
- Limited evidence of due care and due diligence exists, where it would be difficult to legitimately disprove a claim of negligence for how cybersecurity/privacy controls are implemented and maintained.
- Level 2 Maturity: Planned & Tracked. Practices are “requirements-driven” where the intent of control is met in some circumstances, but not standardized across the assessment boundary:
- Practices are “requirements-driven” (e.g., specified by a law, regulation or contractual obligation) and are tailored to meet those specific compliance obligations (e.g., evidence of due diligence).
- Performance of a control is planned and tracked according to specified procedures and work products conform to prescribed standards (e.g., evidence of due care).
- Controls are implemented in some, but not all applicable circumstances/environments (e.g., specific enclaves, facilities or locations).
- A reasonable person could conclude controls are “compliance-focused” to narrowly meet a specific obligation, since the control(s):
- Are localized to specific systems, applications and/or services; and
- Are not standardized across the authorization boundary.
- Sufficient evidence of due care and due diligence exists to demonstrate compliance with specific statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.
- Level 3 Maturity: Well Defined. This level of maturity is defined as “standardized practices,” where the control implementation is well-defined and standardized across the assessment boundary:
- From the perspective of the CDPAS, Level 3 maturity practices are standardized across the Assessment Boundary, where this could be across:
- The entire organization;
- A specific contract, project or initiative;
- A specific Business Unit (BU) within an organization; or
- A specific country, or geographic region, of the organization’s business operations.
- Controls are implemented in all applicable circumstances/environments (deviations are documented and justified).
- Performance of a control is according to specified well-defined and standardized procedures.
- Control execution is planned and managed using an enterprise-wide, standardized methodology.
- Sufficient evidence of due care and due diligence exists to demonstrate compliance with specific statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.
- Level 4 Maturity: Quantitatively Controlled. This level of maturity is defined as “metrics-driven practices,” where in addition to being well-defined and standardized control implementation across the assessment boundary, there are detailed metrics to enable governance oversight:
- Practices are “metrics-driven” and provide sufficient management insight (based on a quantitative understanding of process capabilities) to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and identify areas for improvement.
- Practices build upon established Level 3 maturity criteria and have detailed metrics to enable governance oversight.
- Detailed measures of performance are collected and analyzed. This leads to a quantitative understanding of process capability and an improved ability to predict performance.
- Performance is objectively managed and the quality of work products is quantitatively known.
- Level 5 Maturity: Continuously Improving. This level of maturity is defined as “world-class practices,” where control implementation is not only well-defined and standardized across the organization (with detailed metrics), processes are continuously improving:
- Practices are “world-class” capabilities that leverage predictive analysis.
- Practices build upon established Level 4 maturity criteria and are time-sensitive to support operational efficiency, which likely includes automated actions through machine learning or Artificial Intelligence (AI).
- Quantitative performance goals (targets) for process effectiveness and efficiency are established, based on the business goals of the organization.
- Process improvements are implemented according to “continuous improvement” practices to affect process changes.
Defined Materiality Threshold
OSA must define the criteria for materiality, as it pertains to its security, compliance and resilience program.
Justification
The intended usage of materiality is meant to provide relevant context, regarding risk thresholds. Materiality designations are intended to act as a "guard rail" for risk management decisions. A material weakness crosses an organization’s risk threshold by making an actual difference to the organization, where systems, applications, services, personnel, the organization and/or third-parties are, or may be, exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.
Guidance
The SCF Council defines the materiality threshold for an organization’s security, compliance and resilience program as, “A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in an organization’s cybersecurity and/or data protection controls (across its supply chain) where it is probable that reasonable threats will not be prevented or detected in a timely manner that directly, or indirectly, affects assurance that the organization can adhere to its stated risk tolerance.”
Publicly traded companies regulated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must disclose “material cybersecurity incidents” on Form 8-K, Item 1.05(a). A financial benchmark is commonly used to determine materiality. Materiality goes beyond SEC Form 8-K filings and is valuable for the broader concept of risk management practices, since it helps an organization clearly understand what is important versus what is not important. Prioritization is key in risk management and determining materiality thresholds is a tool that should be utilized.
Generally, account criteria from pre-tax income, total assets, total revenue and total equity to provide options for both "single criteria determinations" and "averaged determinations" to establish objective thresholds. From a financial benchmark perspective, for something to be considered material, the control deficiency, risk, threat or incident (singular or a combination) generally must meet one, or more, of the following criteria where the potential financial impact is measured as:
- ≥ 5% of pre-tax income
- ≥ 0.5% of total assets
- ≥ 1% of total equity (shareholder value); and/or
- ≥ 0.5% of total revenue.
Material Risk Designation
OSA must:
- Identify risks from its risk catalog that have the potential to pose a material impact; and
- Designate those identified risks as material risks.
Justification
The intended usage of materiality is meant to provide relevant context, regarding risk thresholds. A material risk crosses an organization’s risk threshold by making an actual difference to the organization, where systems, applications, services, personnel, the organization and/or third-parties are, or may be, exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.
Guidance
See Appendix B: Risk Terminology Normalization for context on risk management concepts. A risk is:
- Where someone or something valued is exposed to danger, harm or loss (noun); or
- To expose someone or something valued to danger, harm or loss (verb).
When there is an identified risk that poses a material impact, that is a material risk:
- A material risk is a quantitative or qualitative scenario where the exposure to danger, harm or loss has a material impact (e.g., potential class action lawsuit, death related to product usage, etc.); and
- A material risk should be identified and documented in an organization's "risk catalog" that chronicles the organization's relevant and plausible risks.
Material Threat Designation
OSA must:
- Identify threats from its threat catalog that have the potential to pose a material impact; and
- Designate those identified risks as material threats.
Justification
The intended usage of materiality is meant to provide relevant context, regarding risk thresholds. A material threat crosses an organization’s risk threshold by making an actual difference to the organization, where systems, applications, services, personnel, the organization and/or third-parties are, or may be, exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.
Guidance
A threat:
- Is a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger (noun); or
- Indicates impending damage or danger (verb).
When there is an identified threat that poses a material impact, that is a material threat:
- A material threat is a vector that causes damage or danger that has a material impact (e.g., poorly governed Artificial Intelligence (AI) initiatives, nation state hacking operations, dysfunctional internal management practices, etc.); and
- A material threat should be identified and documented in an organization's "threat catalog" that chronicles the organization's relevant and plausible threats.
Material Incident Designation
OSA must:
- Identify reasonable incidents that have the potential to pose a material impact; and
- Designate those identified risks as material incidents.
Justification
The intended usage of materiality is meant to provide relevant context, regarding risk thresholds. A material incident crosses an organization’s risk threshold by making an actual difference to the organization, where systems, applications, services, personnel, the organization and/or third-parties are, or may be, exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.
Guidance
An incident is an occurrence that actually or potentially:
- Jeopardizes the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability or Safety (CIAS) of a system, application, service or the data that it processes, stores and/or transmits; and/or
- Constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violating an organization's policies, procedures or acceptable use practices.
When there is an incident that poses a material impact, that is a material incident:
- A material incident is an occurrence that does or has the potential to:
- Affect the CIAS of systems, applications, services or data; or
- Violate organizational practices that have a material impact (e.g., malware on sensitive and/or regulated systems, emergent AI actions, illegal conduct, business interruption, etc.); and
- Reasonably foreseeable material incidents should be documented in an organization's Incident Response Plan (IRP) that chronicles the organization's relevant and plausible incidents, so there are appropriate processes to identify, respond to and recover from such incidents.
Internal Assessment
To demonstrate evidence of assessment readiness for 3PAAC Services to a 3PAO, OSA must:
- Perform at least one (1) internal cybersecurity and/or data protection controls assessment in preparation for an external assessment by a 3PAO; and
- Document the internal assessment(s) as part of the OSA’s assessment preparation process.
Justification
Performing internal assessments to demonstrate readiness for 3PAAC Services is a due diligence activity. The OSA has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Being unprepared to engage with a 3PAO for 3PAAC Services is fiscally irresponsible, since 3PAAC Services are costly and the likelihood of a successful assessment without evidence of due diligence is remote.
Guidance
OSAs should perform and document internal assessments with the same level of rigor and reasonable interpretation of controls expected from a 3PAO.
Implemented Capability
To be considered an Implemented Capability (IC) and be assessable by a 3PAO, an OSA’s:
- Technology capabilities will only be considered implemented if the system(s), application(s) and/or service(s) has/have been operational in a production environment for at least sixty (60) days;
- Administrative processes will only be considered implemented if there is evidence to demonstrate that process has been:
- Used in a real-world situation (e.g., onboarding/offboarding personnel, incident response, etc.); and/or
- Formally tested (e.g., documented incident response exercise); and
- Physical capabilities will only be considered implemented if the physical security mechanism(s) has/have been operational in a production environment for at least thirty (30) days.
Justification
It takes time for a control to be in place before it can legitimately be verified as being both employed and operational, where the control is operating as intended. This is applicable to technologies, administrative processes and physical security mechanisms.
Guidance
An Implemented Capability is a technical, administrative or physical mechanism that exists in a production environment and can demonstrate reasonable effectiveness.
Due Diligence (Assessors & 3PAOs)
Standard Requirement
3PAOs must:
- Perform due diligence activities in preparation for an assessment;
- Document these activities as part of the 3PAO’s assessment planning process; and
- Include the justification for accepting the OSA’s readiness for 3PAAC Services.
Justification
Due diligence is simply taking reasonable steps to avoid harm. Therefore, 3PAOs must perform due diligence activities for all assessments.
Guidance
Treating assessments as discrete projects can help a 3PAO perform and document due diligence activities, since many activities are commonly expected for engagements.
Standard 4 - Sub-Requirements
Formalized Assessment Plan
3PAOs must:
- Formalize OSA-specific assessment plans; and
- Designate an Assessment Team Lead (ATL) with assigned responsibilities to conduct 3PAAC Services.
Justification
It is a reasonable expectation for 3PAOs to present a formalized assessment plan to the OSA.
Guidance
Treating assessments as discrete projects can help a 3PAO perform and document due diligence activities, since these activities are commonly expected for assessment engagements. Adequately formulating the plan includes formal documentation of fieldwork steps that reasonably support execution of the 3PAO’s assessment methodology from fieldwork initiation to completion, including report development, peer review and issuance.
3PAOs should leverage NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, for guidance on security assessment execution:
- Security assessment planning:
- Developing a security assessment policy;
- Prioritizing and scheduling assessments;
- Selecting and customizing techniques;
- Assessment logistics:
- Assessor selection and skills;
- Location selection; and
- Technical tools and resources selection;
- Assessment plan develop; and
- Legal considerations;
- Security assessment execution:
- Coordination;
- Assessing;
- Analysis; and
- Data handling:
- Data collection;
- Data storage;
- Data transmission; and
- Data destruction; and
- Post-testing activities:
- Mitigating recommendations;
- Reporting; and
- Remediation/mitigation.
DODM 8140.03 should be used for competence criteria for the role of an ATL. Based on the position category and seniority for the role, the ATL is expected to be an “senior-level SCF Assessor” with the following qualifications:
- An undergraduate degree:
- From an: Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) accredited; or Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) designated institution; and
- In one of the following degrees: Information Technology (IT); Cybersecurity; Data Science; Information Systems; or Computer Science (CS); and/or
- One (1) of the following certifications:
- CISM: ISACA Certified Information Security Manager;
- CISA: ISACA Certified Information Systems Auditor;
- CISSP: ISC2 Certified Information Systems Security Professional;
- CISSP-ISSEP: ISC2 CISSP Information Systems Security Engineering Professional;
- GCSA: GIAC Cloud Security Automation;
- GSLC: GIAC Security Leadership Certification;
- GSNA: GIAC Systems and Network Auditor;
- CySA+: CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst plus;
- C)ISSO: Certified Information Systems Security Officer;
- C)PTE: Certified Penetration Testing Engineer; and/or
- FITSP-A: Federal IT Security Professional-Auditor.
Defined Assessment Boundaries
3PAOs must:
- Validate the scope of the assessment by defining assessment boundaries; and
- Limit assessor activities to the defined assessment boundary.
Justification
Assessors and 3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors must recognize the boundary and restrict assessment activities to systems, applications, services, personnel and third parties within that defined boundary.
Guidance
The Unified Scoping Guide (USG) provides a methodology to assist 3PAOs with:
- Validating control boundaries; and
- Defining the scope of the sensitive and/or regulated data where it is stored, transmitted and/or processed.
Validate Control Applicability
3PAOs must ensure applicable cybersecurity and/or data protection controls to be assessed are:
- Applicable to the scope of the SOW; and
- Validated by the OSA.
Justification
OSA must have documented evidence to justify the assessment scope to the 3PAO. As part of due diligence activities, 3PAOs need to know the specific cybersecurity and/or data protection controls that will make up the assessment, confined within the assessment boundary(ies).
Guidance
Documentation of an OSA’s controls by the assessor on behalf of, or in conjunction with, the OSA would not be considered a COI. For the purposes of completing the assessment, this clarification of applicable controls would not constitute “control design or implementation” services.
Defined Evidence Request List
(ERL)
Based on the defined cybersecurity and/or data protection controls, the assessor must provide the OSA with an Evidence Request List (ERL) that defines the SOW-specific artifacts necessary to perform 3PAAC Services. For evidence:
- The OSA must provide evidence artifacts of a level of detail, accuracy and formatting to satisfy assessment rigor criteria that are:
- Of a level of detail, accuracy and formatting to satisfy assessment rigor criteria; and
- No more than one (1) year old; and
- The 3PAO may request additional evidence artifacts, or clarification of OSA-submitted ERL artifacts, as necessary to perform 3PAAC Services.
Justification
Assessors and 3PAOs operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, minimizing “scope creep” that can increase the duration, cost and personnel commitments associated with an assessment is essential. As part of due diligence activities, assessors and 3PAOs are expected to:
- Define an authoritative ERL; and
- Before the start of the assessment, provide any artifact requests to the OSA.
An ERL provides assessment-specific artifacts where:
- It establishes a minimum level of reasonable evidence necessary for the 3PAO to conduct 3PAAC Services;
- The intent is for ERLs to establish a finite list of supporting evidence used in an assessment; and
- Prior to the start of the assessment, an ERL will be provided by the 3PAO to the OSA.
Guidance
The SCF provides ERL that assessors and 3PAOs can use. The ERL is part of the SCF download. The ERL represents the minimum level of reasonable evidence requests.
Explicit Authorization For Testing
Prior to performing assessment-related control testing activities, 3PAOs must obtain written authorization from the OSA in the form of a:
- Signed contract;
- MSA;
- SOW; and/or
- Change order.
Justification
Obtaining explicit authorization minimizes liability to assessors and 3PAOs. The assumption is that an OSA's network is highly integrated with dependencies that can affect the ability of the organization to perform its business operations. Therefore, 3PAOs must receive written authorization to perform specific assessment-related control testing activities.
Guidance
Any control testing activities should be viewed similarly to precautions taken by a third-party to perform a vulnerability assessment or penetrating testing engagement.
First-Party Declarations (1PD): Control Inheritance
Assessors must review available 1PD artifacts to understand possible dependencies and control inheritance, if applicable and/or available. 1PDs must:
- Originate from internal audits and/or assessments by:
- The OSA; and/or
- ESPs that impact the OSA’s assessment boundary;
- If applicable, document the ESP’s service(s) the OSA is claiming control inheritance in:
- A contract between the OSA and ESP; and
- A RASCI matrix, or similar form of customer responsibility matrix, that clearly identifies applicable roles and responsibilities associated with inherited controls;
- Contain sufficient detail to determine the applicability of inherited cybersecurity and/or data protection controls;
- Specify the specific controls being inherited;
- Validate that controls identified for inheritance share the same assessment boundary(ies);
- Reflect the current architecture of the OSA’s network infrastructure; and
- Have been generated within the past twelve (12) months.
Justification
It is a reasonable assumption that an OSA will have third-party dependencies. The OSA may provide self-attestations from supporting organizations to demonstrate control implementation. 1PD may address significant control inheritance (e.g., third-party control responsibility, service providers' security certifications, etc.), but this evidence requires some form of validation by the 3PAO.
Most assessments can be considered “black box” endeavors, where the assessor has no previous information on the environment being assessed. However, some assessments are “gray box” or “white box” assessments where the assessor is expected to work off previous evidence.
Guidance
It is at the 3PAO’s discretion to perform limited or in-depth control testing to validate control inheritance.
Third-Party Attestations (3PA): Control Inheritance & Reciprocity
Assessors must review available 3PA artifacts to understand possible dependencies and control inheritance, if applicable and/or available. 3PA must:
- Be from a reputable third-party with subject matter expertise in the topic being attested to;
- If applicable, document the ESP’s service(s) the OSA is claiming control inheritance in:
- A contract between the OSA and ESP; and
- A RASCI matrix, or similar form of customer responsibility matrix, that clearly identifies applicable roles and responsibilities associated with inherited controls;
- Contain sufficient detail to determine the applicability of inherited cybersecurity and/or data protection controls;
- Specify the specific controls:
- Being inherited; and/or
- Claiming reciprocity;
- Validate that controls identified for inheritance and/or reciprocity share the same assessment boundary(ies);
- Reflect the current architecture of the OSA’s network infrastructure; and
- Have been generated within the past twelve (12) months.
Justification
It is a reasonable assumption that an OSA will have third-party dependencies. The OSA may be provided with third-party attestations (e.g., SOC 2, ISO 27001, CMMC, etc.) to demonstrate control implementation. 3PA may address significant control inheritance (e.g., third-party control responsibility, service providers' security certifications, etc.), but this evidence requires some form of validation by the 3PAO.
Guidance
For properly scoped and applicable controls:
- 3PAOs are required to accept the reciprocity decision from the authoritative body; and
- It is at the 3PAO’s discretion to perform limited or in-depth control testing to validate control inheritance.
Stakeholder Validation
Assessors must validate the applicability of pertinent assessment stakeholders, based on the OSA’s provided:
- Assessment boundary demarcation;
- Graphical representation of assessment boundary(ies);
- RASCI matrix;
- Defined cybersecurity and/or data protection controls; and
- When applicable:
- 1PD and/or
- 3PA.
Justification
Identified stakeholders provide justification for the defined assessment boundary. If the identified stakeholders do not support the assessment boundary, there is an indication that:
- The scope of the assessment may be incorrect;
- The defined cybersecurity and/or data protection controls are incorrect; and/or
- The identified stakeholders are incorrect.
Guidance
Stakeholder identification can be achieved by documenting a RASCI matrix.
Due Care (OSAs)
Standard Requirement
OSA must perform due care activities when executing:
- Control design;
- Control implementation; and
- Continued operation.
Justification
Due care is the conduct a reasonable person with appropriate skills and experience, would exercise in a similar situation. Therefore, OSAs are expected to operate by a standard of care that others in the industry would reasonably follow.
Guidance
Treating assessments as discrete projects can help an OSA perform and document due care activities. This requires proactive governance on behalf of the OSA.
Standard 5 - Sub-Requirements
Proactive Governance
OSA must assign an employee with sufficient authority and subject matter expertise to proactively govern the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program(s).
Justification
Proactive governance is the opposite of reactive governance, where an issue or problem is addressed after it becomes a crisis. OSAs are expected to govern its security, compliance and resilience program proactively.
Guidance
It is possible for one role to oversee both security, compliance and resilience efforts. However, common roles associated with hierarchical authority for the security, compliance and resilience programs include:
- From a cybersecurity perspective for cybersecurity-related leadership:
- Chief Information Security Officer (CISO); and
- Director of Cybersecurity, or a comparable position.
- From a data protection perspective for data privacy-related leadership:
- Chief Privacy Officer (CPO).
Proactive governance is a continuous process of risk and threat identification, analysis and remediation. In addition, it also includes proactively updating policies, standards and procedures in response to emerging threats or regulatory changes.
OSAs should leverage NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, for guidance on:
- Review techniques:
- Documentation review;
- Log review;
- Ruleset review;
- System configuration review;
- Network sniffing and;
- File integrity checking; and
- Target identification and analysis techniques:
- Network discovery;
- Network port and service identification;
- Vulnerability scanning; and
- Wireless scanning.
Non-Conformity Oversight
OSA must document, assess and implement remediation actions to address instances of non-conformity, where deficiencies with:
- Material controls are remediated without delay; and
- Non-material controls are remediated according to the:
- Risk associated with the non-conforming control; and
- OSA’s established vulnerability management and/or change management practices.
Justification
A formal methodology is necessary to provide non-conformity oversight.
Guidance
As part of proactive governance, it is expected that OSAs will encounter instances of non-conformity due to business and technology-related changes or limitations. This ongoing process of evolving cybersecurity and/or data protection practices to meet changes in business and technology requires proactive governance suitable of withstanding scrutiny by an independent third-party. Formal oversight of non-conformities is necessary to systematically identify, track and remediate gaps in cybersecurity and/or data protection controls. For example, establishing a corrective action plan with timelines and responsibilities helps ensure that identified issues are addressed promptly and effectively.
Annual Affirmation
OSA must:
- Internally perform an annual assessment that validates:
- The assessment boundary(ies) for issued certifications;
- POA&M items are proactively managed to remediate identified deficiencies; and
- Implemented changes are not material to the assessment boundary(ies); and
- Affirm the status of its security, compliance and resilience controls continues to support its conformity designation for applicable certifications.
Justification
Annual affirmations:
- Ensure OSAs conduct periodic checks; and
- Verify that unaccounted for material changes have not occurred.
Guidance
The organization official making the annual affirmation should be the senior individual responsible for the organization’s compliance requirements. This individual should:
- Be assigned the role of monitoring compliance with applicable requirements; and
- Have the technical competence to understand how compliance can be objectively demonstrated.
Per Standard 9, material and non-material changes are defined as:
- Material Change. A material change to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program is where the OSA performed a broad scope of significant changes to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
- Non-Material Change. A non-material change to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program is where the OSA performed a limited scope of minor changes to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
The content of the affirmation should include the following information:
- Name, title, and contact information for the individual performing the affirmation; and
- An affirmation statement attesting that the OSA has implemented and continues to maintain all applicable cybersecurity and/or data protection controls relevant to PPTDF within the relevant assessment boundary.
Due Care (Assessors & 3PAOs)
Standard Requirement
3PAOs must perform due care activities in the execution of assessment activities.
Justification
Due care is the conduct a reasonable person with appropriate skills and experience would exercise in a similar situation. Therefore, assessors and 3PAOs are expected to operate by a standard of care that others in the industry would reasonably follow.
Guidance
Treating assessments as discrete projects can help a 3PAO perform and document due care activities. This requires proactive governance on behalf of the 3PAO.
Standard 6 - Sub-Requirements
Assessment Methods
Assessors must:
- Utilize an assessment method in accordance with the SOW; and
- Specify one (1) of the following assessment methods:
- Manual Point In Time (MPIT). MPIT is a traditional assessment methodology that:
- Is relevant to a specific point in time (time at which the controls were evaluated); and
- Relies on the manual review of artifacts to derive a finding;
- Automated Point In Time (APIT). APIT utilizes automation to augment a traditional assessment methodology, where Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Technologies (AAT) are used to compare the desired state of conformity versus the current state via machine-readable configurations and/or assessment evidence:
- Is relevant to a specific point in time (time at which the controls were evaluated);
- In situations where technology cannot evaluate evidence, evidence is manually reviewed; and
- The combined output of automated and manual reviews of artifacts is used to derive a finding; or
- Automated Evidence with Human Review (AEHR). AEHR is used for ongoing, continuous control assessments:
- AAT continuously evaluates controls by comparing the desired state of conformity versus the current state through machine-readable configurations and/or assessment evidence; and
- Recurring human reviews:
- Evaluate the legitimacy of the results from automated control assessments; and
- Validate the automated evidence review process to derive a finding.
- Manual Point In Time (MPIT). MPIT is a traditional assessment methodology that:
Justification
The SOW is expected to capture the assessment method, since that establishes the context for expected assessor involvement and related costs. The adoption of automation technologies for 3PAAC Services must be addressed to:
- Adjust to evolving technologies available to 3PAOs; and
- Avoid improper assumptions about control evaluation practices.
Guidance
It is acceptable for a 3PAO to offer a single assessment method (e.g., MPIT). However, 3PAOs are expected to have procedures developed for each assessment method offered as part of its 3PAAC Services.
APIT and AEHR may leverage Artificial Intelligence and/or Machine Learning (AI/ML) technologies. In the case of AI/ML being used, 3PAOs must be prepared to demonstrate sufficient evidence of due diligence and due care to justify the integrity of the findings and overall assessment results (e.g., evidence of validating results, test cases, etc.).
See Appendix C: Assessment Rigor for more details on how assessment methods relate to assessment rigor. At a minimum:
- Standard rigor should be used for MPIT assessments;
- Enhanced rigor should be used for APIT assessments; and
- Comprehensive rigor should be used for AEHR assessments.
Assessment Rigor
Assessors must perform the assessment at a level of rigor in accordance with the SOW. There are three (3) levels of rigor:
- Level 1 Rigor: Standard. Standard rigor assessments provide a level of understanding of the administrative, technical and physical cybersecurity and/or data protection measures necessary for determining whether the applicable controls are:
- Implemented; and
- Free of obvious errors.
- Level 2 Rigor: Enhanced. Enhanced rigor assessments provide a level of understanding of the administrative, technical and physical cybersecurity and/or data protection measures necessary for determining whether:
- The applicable controls are:
- Implemented; and
- Free of obvious/apparent errors; and
- There are increased grounds for confidence that the applicable controls are:
- Implemented correctly; and
- Operating as intended.
- The applicable controls are:
- Level 3 Rigor: Comprehensive. Comprehensive rigor assessments provide a level of understanding of the administrative, technical and physical cybersecurity and/or data protection measures necessary for determining:
- Whether the applicable controls are:
- Implemented; and
- Free of obvious/apparent errors;
- Whether there are further increased grounds for confidence that the applicable controls are:
- Implemented correctly; and
- Operating as intended on an ongoing and consistent basis; and
- There is support for continuous improvement in the effectiveness of the applicable controls.
- Whether the applicable controls are:
Justification
It is essential to establish the expectation for the level of rigor to be performed by the assessment team. The SOW is expected to capture the level of rigor, since that establishes the context for expected assessor involvement and related costs. At a minimum:
- Standard rigor should be used for MPIT assessments;
- Enhanced rigor should be used for APIT assessments; and
- Comprehensive rigor should be used for AEHR assessments.
Guidance
See Appendix C: Assessment Rigor for more details on assessment rigor. 3PAOs are expected to have assessment plans developed for each level of rigor. In addition, the 3PAO is expected to develop clear criteria for determining the level of rigor (Standard, Enhanced, Comprehensive) based on the OSA’s needs, risk appetite and risk profile. OSAs are responsible for selecting the most appropriate level of rigor to address their unique assessment requirements.
Assessing Based On Control Applicability
Assessors must limit their evidence examination, interviews and testing activities based on the applicability of the assessed cybersecurity and/or data protection controls. A single cybersecurity and/or data protection control primarily applies to only one (1) of the following functions:
- People;
- Processes;
- Technologies;
- Data; and/or
- Facilities.
Justification
Control scoping does not mean all controls apply uniformly to every asset, individual or facility. There is a common misconception that if something is “in scope” then every control will be applicable across the entire assessment boundary. This is an incorrect assumption, since the nature of a control is primarily administrative, technical or physical. This means specific controls may not apply to all assets, processes, people and locations.
Guidance
Control scoping is not the same thing as control applicability, since it is technically infeasible to apply all controls uniformly, based on control applicability:
- Controls are primarily administrative, technical and/or physical. This means that there may be controls that are not applicable.
- It is possible for a control to apply across more than a single function. However, in most cases, controls apply to a single function.
The recommended solution is to create some form of a matrix that can apply the appropriate controls to the correct PPTDF to help identify the proper scope for the implementation of controls:
- People: Control directly applies to humans (e.g., training, background checks, non-disclosure agreements, etc.).
- Processes: Control directly applies to administrative work performed (e.g., processes, procedures, administrative documentation, etc.).
- Technologies: Control directly applies to systems, applications and services (e.g., secure baseline configurations, patching, etc.).
- Data: Control directly applies to data protection (e.g., encrypting sensitive and/or regulated data, applying metatags, etc.).
- Facilities: Control directly applies to infrastructure assets (e.g., physical access, HVAC systems, visitor control, etc.).
Example 1: Network firewall
- A network firewall is a technology asset where specific other controls would be applicable, such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), access control, secure baseline configurations and patch management.
- A network firewall is a device. Therefore, a network firewall is not capable of undergoing end user training, completing a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) or conducting incident response exercises.
Example 2: User awareness training
- User awareness training focuses on personnel, such as employees and applicable third parties, who will interact with the organization's systems and data. NDAs, threat intelligence awareness and acceptable use notifications apply to individuals.
- An individual is not a device. Therefore, an individual is not capable of having a secure baseline configuration applied, be scanned by a vulnerability assessment tool, or have missing patches installed.
Example 3: Incident Response Plan (IRP)
- An IRP is a documented process that guides incident response operations.
- An IRP is not an individual or technology. Therefore, an IRP cannot sign an NDA, have MFA or be patched.
Assessment Objectives
(AOs)
Assessors must evaluate controls by utilizing Assessment Objectives (AOs), when AOs are available.
Justification
AOs are objective statements that establish the desired outcome for the assessment for a specific control. There may be multiple AOs associated with a control.
Guidance
AOs provide objective criteria that each must be satisfied to legitimately determine whether the control is implemented and operating as intended. The SCF has a catalog of AOs that 3PAOs can use, including:
- SCF baseline;
- NIST SP 800-53A R5;
- NIST SP 800-171A;
- NIST SP 800-171A R3; and
- NIST SP 800-172A.
Control Designation
Assessors must designate a status to assessed controls as follows:
- There are four (4) possible designations:
- Satisfactory;
- Deficient;
- Alternative Control (e.g., compensating control(s)); or
- Not Applicable (N/A);
- Where AOs are available, for a control to be designated as Satisfactory, each of the control’s applicable AOs must be designated as:
- Satisfactory;
- Alternative Control; or
- N/A; and
- If all of the following conditions exist, a control designated as Deficient may be re-evaluated during the course of the assessment and for up to ten (10) business days following the active assessment period if:
- Additional evidence:
- Is available to demonstrate the control is satisfied; and
- Cannot change, or limit the effectiveness of, other requirements that have previously been scored Satisfactory; and
- The Report on Conformity (ROC) has not been delivered to the OSA.
- Additional evidence:
Justification
The assessed status of controls needs a standardized status designation. A standardized methodology to describe the assessed status of a control is necessary to maintain the integrity of the assessment process.
Guidance
In the context of control designations, a designation of:
- Satisfactory is positive, where the criteria are met;
- Deficient is negative, where the criteria are not met;
- Alternative Control is neutral, where another control, or controls, is/are designated as sufficiently reducing the risk(s) associated with the control; and
- N/A is neutral, where the control, or AO, does not apply.
Objectivity Through Reasonable Interpretation
Assessors must maintain objectivity through the following:
- Reasonable interpretation of:
- Controls; and
- When available, AOs; and
- Analysis of relevant evidence from:
- Examinations;
- Interviews; and/or
- Testing.
Justification
Assessors operate from a position of trust and authority. Therefore, assessors must utilize objectivity through reasonable interpretation of both AOs and evidence. Objectivity and reasonableness are cornerstone expectations for any professional. The testing of controls determines the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the applicable AOs.
Guidance
If a control doesn't meet the intent of the design, there is no need to test its effectiveness. Assessors should leverage NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, for guidance on:
- Review techniques:
- Documentation review;
- Log review;
- Ruleset review;
- System configuration review;
- Network sniffing and;
- File integrity checking; and
- Target identification and analysis techniques:
- Network discovery;
- Network port and service identification;
- Vulnerability scanning; and
- Wireless scanning.
Appendix D: Adequate Security provides context about determining “reasonableness” in the context of evaluating cybersecurity and/or data protection controls. For a 3PAO to maintain reasonable interpretation by its assessment team, it is expected to:
- Implement sound hiring practices to attract and retain quality individuals;
- Ensure assessors receive continuing education that is specific to assessment-related activities to maintain situational awareness of leading industry practices; and
- Perform After Action Reviews (AARs) with an OSA to identify possible conflicts where reasonable interpretation was not followed.
Adequate Sampling
For reasonable evidence of conformity:
- Assessors must obtain an adequate sampling of applicable evidence to make a reasonable determination of conformity; and
- The sampling must represent the period of operation relevant to the assessment.
Justification
Assessors are expected to use one (1), or more, of these sampling methods to help ensure that the assessment results are representative of the overall environment, providing a reliable basis for evaluating control effectiveness:
- Simple random sampling;
- Stratified sampling;
- Systemic sampling; and/or
- Cluster sampling.
Guidance
Simple random sampling is preferred for performing Standard and Enhanced assessments. This involves randomly selecting a subset of people, processes, technologies, data sets and facilities to evaluate cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
Appendix D: Adequate Security provides context about determining adequacy. The assessor establishes adequate evidence to support a conclusion of sufficient operation for the period as follows:
- Adequate evidence is defined by reasonable, not absolute assurance principles; and
- Adequacy is determined by the assessor for each control included in the scope boundary.
Adequate evidence of conformity would suggest multiple samples are selected across the previous twelve (12)-month period of operation in which the samples would be available and in the same format for a randomized period of dates selected by the assessor, validating the evidence (e.g., log file) was present and generated for that period (e.g., asset created the log event).
Assessment Tools & Automation
3PAOs must implement assessment-related mechanisms to:
- Improve accuracy; and
- Reduce human error.
Justification
Traditional, manual assessment methodologies are inefficient and error-prone. 3PAOs should incorporate automated mechanisms (e.g., a Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) solution) or advanced assessment tools (e.g., Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Technologies (AAT)) to:
- Increase the efficiency of the assessment process; and
- Reduce:
- Human error; and
- The ability of an assessor to skew data.
Guidance
Relying on hand-written notes or ad hoc spreadsheets is something that 3PAOs should strive to avoid. The use of Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) platforms with specific control assessment functions should be considered a minimal expectation for an assessment tool utilized by 3PAO for 3PAAC Services.
Quality Control
Standard Requirement
3PAOs must systematically examine and evaluate assessment processes, procedures, activities and deliverables to ensure compliance with established quality standards and requirements.
Justification
An assessment's results can have positive, negative or neutral consequences for the OSA. Therefore, quality control by the 3PAO is crucial to ensure the assessment results accurately reflect the actual state of cybersecurity and/or data protection controls. This requires internal quality control processes by the 3PAO.
Guidance
The 3PAO is expected to adhere to a relevant Quality Management System (QMS), as defined by industry-recognized practices (e.g., ISO 9001, ISO 17020, etc.).
Standard 7 - Sub-Requirements
Assessment Findings
To ensure the ability of a reasonable individual, having a similar amount of knowledge and experience, to arrive at the same conclusion(s), 3PAOs must:
- Document assessment findings;
- Objectively confirm the validity of the assessment team’s conclusions; and
- If applicable, submit assessment results to the appropriate:
- Accreditation Body (AB); or
- Governing body.
Justification
Assessment teams may be made up of both employees of a 3PAO and independent contractors. Due to this possible transitory nature of individual assessors, assessment findings must be documented in a manner that a reasonable individual, with similar qualifications and experience, could evaluate the same facts and circumstances and arrive at the same conclusion as the original assessor.
Guidance
The documentation of assessment findings to ensure reasonableness is expected to be included in the 3PAO's quality control processes. The documentation of assessment findings should include but is not limited to:
- Detailed descriptions of the findings and their impact on the OSA’s cybersecurity posture;
- Evidence supporting each finding, such as logs, screenshots, or interview notes; and
- Recommendations for remediation and timelines for implementing corrective actions.
Assessors may provide initial findings to the OSA as “end of day” or “end of period” out briefing to give the OSA situational awareness on the status of the assessment.
3PAOs should leverage NIST SP 800-115, Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, for guidance on security assessment related:
- Mitigating recommendations;
- Reporting; and
- Remediation/mitigation.
Objective Peer Review
Assessors must obtain an objective peer review of all assessment-related findings before presenting findings to the OSA.
Justification
Objectivity is essential when documenting assessment findings. Reviewing the findings by a qualified, competent individual not part of the assessment team is crucial to produce a quality assessment report. Internal peer reviews ensure objectivity by having assessment findings evaluated by someone independent of the assessment process. This practice helps identify potential biases or errors and ensures that findings are based on evidence and aligned with established criteria.
Guidance
Peer reviews by people other than the assessment team are expected to be part of the 3PAO’s quality control processes. Peer reviews can be from an internal or third-party resource.
Conformity Designation
Standard Requirement
3PAOs must summarize assessment results with a conformity designation. Only one (1) of the following four (4) possible conformity designations may be used:
Strictly Conforms
The designation of Strictly Conforms is a positive outcome. Strictly Conforms indicates:
- The OSA can demonstrate Strict Conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls, where one hundred percent (100%) of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
- The controls are met and operational;
- Any control designated as Not Applicable (N/A) is validated as such by the assessor; and/or
- Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
- Applicable;
- Reasonable; and
- Implemented and operating properly; and
- Assessed controls provide reasonable assurance that the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program provides adequate security, where it:
- Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
- Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks;
- Is designed to detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and
- Is prepared to respond to material incidents.
Conforms
The designation of Conforms is a positive outcome. Conforms indicates:
- The OSA can demonstrate conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls, where at least eighty percent (80%) of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
- The controls are met and operational;
- Any control designated as N/A is validated as such by the assessor; and/or
- Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
- Applicable;
- Reasonable; and
- Implemented and operating properly;
- Any assessed control deficiency is not material to the OSA's security, compliance and resilience program; and
- Assessed controls provide reasonable assurance that the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program provides adequate security, where it:
- Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
- Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks;
- Is designed to detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and
- Is prepared to respond to material incidents.
Significant Deficiency
The designation of Significant Deficiency is a negative outcome. Significant Deficiency indicates:
- The OSA can demonstrate limited conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls due to a systemic problem within the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program, where:
- At least seventy percent (70%), but less than eighty percent (80%), of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
- The controls are met and operational;
- Any control designated as N/A is validated as such by the assessor; and/or
- Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
- Applicable;
- Reasonable; and
- Implemented and operating properly;
- At least seventy percent (70%), but less than eighty percent (80%), of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
- Any assessed control deficiency is not material to the OSA's security, compliance and resilience program;
- Assessed controls do not provide reasonable assurance that the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program provides adequate security, where it:
- Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
- Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks;
- Is designed to detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and
- Is prepared to respond to material incidents; and
- The OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program:
- Has systemic problems inherent in the overall function of a team, department, project, application, service and/or vendor rather than a specific, isolated factor; and
- Requires implementing limited changes to personnel, technology and/or practices to correct the design and implementation of deficient cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
Material Weakness
The designation of Material Weakness is a negative outcome. Material Weakness indicates:
- The OSA cannot demonstrate conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls due to deficiencies that make it probable that reasonably expected threats will not be promptly detected or prevented, where:
- One (1), or more, material controls is/are deficient; and/or
- Less than seventy percent (70%) of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
- The controls are met and operational;
- Any control designated as N/A is validated by the assessor and confirmed as such; and/or
- Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
- Applicable;
- Reasonable; and
- Implemented and operating properly;
- Assessed controls do not provide reasonable assurance that the OSA’s security, compliance and resilience program adequately:
- Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
- Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks; and/or
- Possesses the capability to:
- Detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and/or
- Respond to material incidents; and
- The OSA's security, compliance and resilience program:
- Cannot perform its stated mission; and
- Drastic changes to people, processes and/or technologies are required to remediate the deficiencies.
Justification
A systemic weakness across existing assessment methodologies is the lack of a standardized assessment conformity designation. Assessment conformity designations are supported by Standard 6.5 (Control Designation) and are used to summarize the overall assessment.
Guidance
See Appendix D: Adequate Security for more details on defining adequate security. The assessment conformity designation is intended for the OSA's executive leadership team to clearly and unambiguously provide a “pass or fail score” to the assessment. The use of the terminology in this standard is recognized throughout the industry, so it avoids reinventing the concept.
An OSA cannot have a Strictly Conforms, Conformity or Significant Deficiency designation with a Material Weakness determination in one (1), or multiple, domain(s)/family(ies) of cybersecurity and/or data protection controls included in the assessment boundary.
Standard 8 - Sub-Requirements
Report On Conformity
(ROC)
3PAOs must produce a written Report on Conformity (ROC) that uses persuasive, reasonable evidence to defend the assessment conformity designation.
Justification
The assessment results must be documented in a professional format capable of defending the assessment conformity designation.
Guidance
The format of a ROC is not standardized in the industry and would be up to a governing body, or 3PAO, to define its specific needs. A ROC should include, but is not limited to the following elements:
- Disclosure of the level of rigor selected for 3PAAC Services (see Appendix C for details on Assessment Rigor);
- A summary of the assessment scope and objectives;
- Detailed findings and evidence supporting each determination;
- An executive summary highlighting the overall conformity status (e.g., Strictly Conforms, Conforms, Significant Deficiency, Material Weakness);
- Recommendations for remediation where deficiencies are identified; and
- A section for the OSA to respond to findings or submit challenges.
This format ensures that the ROC is comprehensive and provides all necessary information for stakeholders to understand the assessment results.
3PAOs are expected to link persuasive, reasonable evidence to the applicable level of rigor and available evidence.
Assessment Finding Challenges
3PAOs must have a formal process to:
- Intake, review and respond to an OSA’s challenges regarding assessment findings, as defined in the:
- MSA; and/or
- SOW; and
- Settle challenges through:
- Direct negotiation;
- If applicable, the applicable Accreditation Body (AB);
- Arbitration; or
- The applicable legal venue, as defined in the:
- MSA; and/or
- SOW.
Justification
3PAOs and OSAs have the right to disagree. However, the ROC reflects the point-in-time observations of the 3PAO’s assessment team. These assessment findings affect the assessment conformity designation issued by the 3PAO. Therefore, 3PAOs must be prepared to handle challenges to assessment findings professionally and responsively. It is reasonable to expect that assessment conformity designation, particularly those identifying a Significant Deficiency or Material Weakness, may lead to disputes or challenges from the OSA. A formalized process for handling these challenges is necessary to maintain the integrity of the assessment and ensure that all concerns are addressed in a fair and transparent manner. This process should include clear guidelines for submitting challenges, timelines for review, criteria for evaluating challenges and procedures for resolution.
Guidance
The 3PAO must ensure the SOW and other documentation it uses as part of its 3PAAC Services covers the processes around challenging assessment findings. This may require legal arbitration for points of contention that cannot be settled solely by the 3PAO and OSA.
To help eliminate unexpected results, assessors may provide initial findings to the OSA as “end of day” or “end of period” out briefing to give the OSA situational awareness on the status of the assessment.
Maintaining Conformity
Standard Requirement
OSA must seek re-assessment when there is a material change to the assets and/or processes that make up the assessment boundary. Changes are defined as:
- Material Change. A material change to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program is where the OSA performed a broad scope of significant changes to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
- Non-Material Change. A non-material change to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program is where the OSA performed a limited scope of minor changes to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
Justification
A 3PAO-issued attestation and/or certification is voided when material changes affect the assessment boundary, since the basis for the attestation and/or certification is no longer applicable.
Guidance
The timeline for remediation should be agreed upon between the 3PAO and the OSA, since the timeline is dependent upon the risk appetite of the organization. However, unless justified by a legitimate business, or technical, reason no POA&M item should be older than one-hundred eighty (180) days. Items older than that should be considered deficient.
- Assessor has the ability to re-evaluate controls during the course of the assessment and for up to ten (10) business days following the active assessment period.
- A “plan to address” a deficiency does not suffice as evidence to support control conformity. The plan to remediate a deficiency must be implemented and operational.
An OSA’s material changes to any certified environment should be coordinated with the 3PAO that performed the most recent assessment. That 3PAO should be contracted to conduct 3PAAC Services to validate, or re-issue, an attestation and/or certification.
- Material changes have a strategic and/or operational impact on the OSA’s cybersecurity and/or data protection capabilities; and
- Non-material changes have a tactical-focused impact on the OSA’s cybersecurity and/or data protection capabilities.
Standard 9 - Sub-Requirements
Plan of Action & Milestones
(POA&M)
OSA must document control deficiencies in a Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M), or similar form of control deficiency tracking mechanism, at a minimum identifies the following:
- Deficient control(s);
- A description of the control deficiency(ies);
- Affected people, processes, technologies, data and/or facilities;
- Designated Point of Contact (POC) for remediation efforts;
- Remediation plan (e.g., milestones, resources needed, etc.);
- Scheduled remediation date; and
- Date remediation was completed.
Justification
A formal methodology is necessary to document identified tasks, responsibilities and milestones associated with control deficiencies. It provides a clear roadmap for addressing weaknesses, assigns responsibilities and sets deadlines for completion, ensuring accountability and timely resolution.
Guidance
The timeline for remediation should be agreed upon between the 3PAO and the OSA, since the timeline is dependent upon the risk appetite of the organization. However, unless justified by a legitimate business, or technical, reason no POA&M item should be older than one-hundred eighty (180) days. Items older than that should be considered deficient.
- Assessor has the ability to re-evaluate controls during the course of the assessment and for up to ten (10) business days following the active assessment period.
- A “plan to address” a deficiency does not suffice as evidence to support control conformity. The plan to remediate a deficiency must be implemented and operational.
A POA&M is a “living document” that can exist in a manner that works best for the OSA, ranging from a simple Excel spreadsheet that serves as a risk register or it can be a dedicated module in a GRC technology platform. POA&Ms:
- Identify tasks that need to be accomplished;
- Provides details on resources required to achieve the elements of the plan;
- Target milestones to meeting the tasks; and
- Track remediation efforts and dates for those milestones.
Changes Affecting The Assessment Boundary
A 3PAO-issued attestation and/or certification is invalidated following any material change to the assets and/or processes that make up the OSA’s assessment boundary.
Justification
A 3PAO-issued attestation and/or certification is voided when material changes affect the assessment boundary. Only through a reassessment of the changes can a certification be maintained. Reassessing the environment after any material change is crucial because such changes can significantly alter the risk landscape and the effectiveness of existing controls.
Guidance
Proper change management practices must consider the implications of making proposed changes. Therefore, material changes should be coordinated with a 3PAO, where an internal audit should be performed once the changes are implemented and then followed by a 3PAO to conduct 3PAAC Services to validate, or re-issue, an attestation and/or certification.
For example, if a company implements a new data management system or undergoes a significant restructuring, these changes could introduce new vulnerabilities or affect the applicability of current controls. To maintain the validity of an attestation, or certification, a reassessment ensures that all controls remain effective and that the organization continues to meet its security, compliance and resilience obligations.
Reassessments Due To Material Change
As part of a reassessment due to material change, assessors:
- Must:
- Conduct 3PAAC Services consistent with the original assessment’s rigor on the assets and/or processes affected by a material change; and
- Limit the scope of the reassessment to the assets and/or processes that changed; and
- May rely on the findings from the most recent, current assessment for unaffected assets and/or processes.
Justification
Engaging a 3PAO to perform a limited assessment for material changes is intended to make 3PAAC Services sustainable from a cost and labor perspective. Conducting a targeted reassessment after material changes ensures that the assessment scope is focused on areas impacted by the changes, optimizing the use of resources and minimizing costs.
Guidance
Per Standard 9, material and non-material changes are defined as:
- Material Change. A material change to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program is where the OSA performed a broad scope of significant changes to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
- Non-Material Change. A non-material change to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection program is where the OSA performed a limited scope of minor changes to the OSA's cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.
A new assessment is required if there are significant architectural or boundary changes to the previous assessment scope. Examples include, but are not limited to:
- Expansions of networks;
- Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities;
- Operational changes within assessment boundary(ies) such as new or changed:
- Technology platforms (e.g., OS migration from Windows to Linux);
- ESP integrations; and/or
- Facilities.
To effectively coordinate reassessments, an OSA should:
- Conduct pre-change consultation. The OSA should consult with the 3PAO before implementing significant changes to understand potential impacts;
- Conduct an internal audit. Once changes are implemented, the OSA should conduct an internal audit to identify any immediate issues or risks introduced by the changes; and
- Engage a 3PAO to schedule a reassessment. Based on the internal audit findings, the OSA should engage the 3PAO to perform a targeted reassessment that focuses solely on the affected areas.
Contributors & Errata
Contributors
The SCF Council would like to thank the following volunteers for their efforts in developing this standard:
Errata
The 2026.3 release of the CDPAS updated:
- Standardized terminology section.
- Material controls for SCF 2026.3 reorganization.
The 2026.2 release of the CDPAS updated:
- URLs to references; and
- Terminology to align with the Security, Compliance and Resilience Management System (SCRMS) that includes changing “cybersecurity & data protection” to “security, compliance and resilience” throughout the document.
The 2026.1 release of the CDPAS document included the following changes from the previous version:
- Formatting standardization across SCF documentation.
- Grammar corrections.
- Updated the Terminology Standardization section to include:
- Assurance;
- Security; and
- Trust.
The 2025.2 release of the CDPAS document included the following changes from the previous version:
- Standard 2.8.
- New standard to address sampling methodologies.
The 2025.1 release of the CDPAS document included the following changes from the previous version:
- Standard 2.1.
- Renamed the standard
- Standard 2.7.
- Updated guidance section.
- Standard 3.2.
- Wordsmithed the standard
- Standard 3.7.
- Renamed standard
- Wordsmithed the standard to adopt "Statement of Applicability (SoA)" terminology.
- Standard 3.8.
- Wordsmithed the standard
- Standard 3.9.
- Corrected formatting in the standard.
- Standard 3.10.
- Updated guidance section.
- Standard 3.15.
- New standard to address when a capability can be declared as implemented (e.g., operational).
- Standard 4.1
- Wordsmithed the standard
- Standard 6.5.
- Corrected formatting in the standard.
- Appendix A.
- Provided updated guidance on determining materiality
- Appendix E.
- Added a new appendix to address minimum Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) criteria.
Appendices
The CDPAS includes five appendices with supporting reference material. Each one is summarized below, and the full content is in the CDPAS PDF.
- Appendix A: Material Controls. How materiality is defined by executive leadership using financial thresholds, how material controls, risks, threats and incidents are identified, and a list of 194 SCF controls, grouped by domain, that would reasonably be considered material controls.
- Appendix B: Risk Terminology Normalization. Definitions of risk appetite, risk tolerance and risk thresholds, with five risk tolerance levels from Low to Extreme.
- Appendix C: Assessment Rigor. The three levels of assessment rigor (Standard, Enhanced and Comprehensive), based on NIST SP 800-172A, with the examine, interview and test methods, depth and coverage that apply to each level.
- Appendix D: Adequate Security. How business planning and analysis lead to stakeholder and system security requirements, what it takes to establish secure systems, and why a "system of systems" mindset matters.
- Appendix E: Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) Guidance. The minimum criteria a DPIA should contain for 3PAOs that do not have their own template, from 3PAO and project information to data sharing, data subject consent, access to data and data protection analysis.
CDPAS Works With The SCF Assessment Ecosystem
The CDPAS draws on other free Secure Controls Framework (SCF) content for evidence, scoping, maturity and assessment objectives.
Evidence Request List (ERL)
Standard 4.4 requires the 3PAO to give the organization an ERL, a finite list of supporting evidence, before the assessment starts. The SCF's ERL is part of the SCF download.
SCR-CMM Maturity Model
The CDPAS uses the six maturity levels of the Secure, Compliant & Resilient Capability Maturity Model (SCR-CMM), Level 0 to Level 5, for the current and target maturity an organization defines under Standard 3.9.
Unified Scoping Guide (USG)
The USG gives 3PAOs a method for validating assessment boundaries and scoping sensitive and regulated data under Standard 4.2.
SCF Workbook
The SCF has a catalog of Assessment Objectives (AOs) that 3PAOs can use under Standard 6.4, and Appendix A of the CDPAS lists the SCF-designated material controls.
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