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SCR-RMM: Risk Management Model

The Secure, Compliant & Resilient Risk Management Model (SCR-RMM) is a free, structured methodology to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk. Jointly developed by ComplianceForge and the SCF, the SCR-RMM breaks risk management down into seventeen (17) distinctive steps, from establishing risk management principles through implementing and documenting risk treatment.

Overview

What Is The SCR-RMM?

The Secure, Compliant & Resilient Risk Management Model (SCR-RMM) is a free, 17-step methodology to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk across the entire organization. It was developed jointly by ComplianceForge and the Secure Controls Framework (SCF).

The SCR-RMM ties risks and threats directly to an organization's controls and standardizes how risk is defined across the organization. Each assessment produces a documented finding for the management that owns the risk and decides how it is handled.

SCR Risk Management Model (SCR-RMM) product card showing ComplianceForge and SCF logos with Security Compliant Resilient branding and link to view example PDF

To help simplify risk management practices, ComplianceForge and the Secure Controls Framework (SCF) jointly developed the Secure, Compliant & Resilient Risk Management Model (SCR-RMM). The concept of creating the SCR-RMM was to establish an efficient methodology to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk across the entire organization.

The SCR-RMM:

  • Is a free solution that organizations can use to holistically approach that breaks risk management down into seventeen (17) distinctive steps;
  • Exists is to help cybersecurity and data privacy functions create a repeatable methodology to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk;
  • Offers flexibility to report on risk at a control level or aggregate level (e.g., a project, department, domain or organization-level); and
  • Guides the decision to a risk treatment option (e.g., reduce, avoid, transfer or accept).

The first order of control selection is to determine “must have” obligations from applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations to define baseline minimums. The second order of control selection is to determine discretionary requirements that are necessary to address organization-specific threats and risks. The SCR-RMM is designed to help determine risk and threat applicability at a control level as:

  • Likely;
  • Possible; and
  • Unlikely.

The most important concept to understand in cybersecurity and data privacy-related risk management is that the cybersecurity and IT departments generally do not “own” technology-related risks, since that “risk ownership” primarily resides with Line of Business (LOB) management. An organization’s cybersecurity and data privacy functions serve as the primary mechanism to educate those LOB stakeholders on identified risks and provide possible risk treatment solutions. Right or wrong, LOB management is ultimately responsible to decide how risk is to be handled.

Where the SCR-RMM exists to help cybersecurity and data privacy functions create a repeatable methodology to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk. This is based on the understanding that the responsibility to approve a risk treatment solution rests with the management of the LOB/department/team/stakeholder that “owns” the risk. The SCR-RMM is meant to guide the decision to one of these common risk treatment options:

  • Reduce the risk to an acceptable level;
  • Avoid the risk;
  • Transfer the risk to another party; or
  • Accept the risk.

It is a common problem for individuals who are directly impacted by risk to simply claim, “I accept the risk” in a misplaced maneuver to make the risk go away, so that the project/initiative can proceed without having to first address deficiencies. This is why it is critically important that as part of a risk management program to identify the various levels of management who have the legitimate authority to make risk management decisions. This can help prevent low-level managers from recklessly accepting risk that should be reserved for more senior management.

Fundamentally, risk management requires educating stakeholders for situational awareness and decision-making purposes, where reporting risk can be summarized by explaining the “health” of the cybersecurity and data privacy program as to how the assessed controls provide assurance that the organization’s stated risk tolerance is or is not achieved. Therefore, the goal of the SCR-RMM is to categorize the risk assessment results according to one (1) of the following four (4) risk determinations:

  • Strictly Conforms;
  • Conforms;
  • Significant Deficiency; or
  • Material Weakness

The intent of having these risk determinations is to normalize the terminology associated with the level of conformity an organization conforms to its applicable cybersecurity and data protection controls. This methodology can help an organization adhere to its risk appetite.

Introduction

"Don't Shoot The Messenger" Protections

The SCR-RMM is designed to enable better risk management decisions to achieve security, compliance and resilience objectives in a defensible manner. The processes established in the SCR-RMM can help minimize uncertainties and therefore provide more pertinent discussions on how an organization can address its applicable threats and risks with available resources.

If you worry about having to preface risk management discussions with, “Don’t shoot the messenger!” then the SCR-RMM can be an additional layer of protection for your professional reputation. Where the SCR-RMM benefits security, technology and privacy personnel is the potential “get out of jail” documentation that quality risk assessments and risk management practices can provide. Just like with compliance documentation, if risk management discussions are not documented then risk management practices do not exist.

Before you read further, ask yourself these two (2) questions about your organization and your personal exposure in risk management:

  • Can you prove that the right people within your organization are both aware of risks and have taken direct responsibility for mitigating those risks?
  • If there was a breach or incident that is due to identified risks that went unmitigated, where does the “finger pointing” for blame immediately go to?

Instead of executive leadership hanging blame on the CIO or CISO, quality risk management documentation can prove that reasonable steps were taken to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk. This type of documentation can provide evidence of due diligence and due care on the part of the CIO/CISO/CRO, which firmly puts the responsibility back on the management of the team/department/line of business that “owns” the risk.

Organizations often face conflicting expectations for risk management, based on department-level practices. For example, where disjointed risk management practices exist, a “Moderate Risk” often has entirely different financial and/or operational impacts across cybersecurity, IT, legal, finance, HR, operations, etc. The concept of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is to apply a comprehensive, organization-wide approach to risk management practices, where each department operates according to a similar playbook, where “Moderate Risk” means the same thing across the entire organization. This helps make an “apples to apples” comparison that can aid in creating a more holistic approach to risk management practices when risk designations are standardized.

Risk management activities are logical and systematic processes that can be used when making well-informed decisions to improve effectiveness and efficiency. Proactive risk management activities have these characteristics:

  • Integrated into Business As Usual (BAU) activities (e.g., everyday work);
  • Focuses on proactive management involvement, rather than reactive crisis management;
  • Identifies and helps prepare for what might happen;
  • Identifies opportunities to improve performance; and
  • Proposes taking action to:
  • Avoid or reduce unwanted exposures; and/or
  • Maximize opportunities identified.

The articulation of risk management concepts is both an art and science. This requires a clear understanding of certain risk management terminology:

  • Risk Appetite;
  • Risk Tolerance; and
  • Risk Threshold.

Risk management decisions must be explained in the context of the business, since risk management practices do not operate in a vacuum. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the environment where risk management practices exist. This also requires a clear understanding of business planning terminology:

  • Mission;
  • Vision; and
  • Strategy.

From a hierarchical perspective:

  • An organization’s risk appetite exists at the corporate level to influence actions and decisions, specifically the organization’s strategy. The strategy provides prioritization and resourcing constraints to the organization’s various Line of Business (LOB).
  • The risk appetite helps define the organization’s risk tolerance to influence actions and decisions at the LOB level. Risk tolerance influences objectives, maturity targets and resource prioritization.
  • Risk thresholds affect actions and decisions at the department and team levels. Risk thresholds influence processes, technologies, staffing levels and the supply chain (e.g., vendors, suppliers, consultants, contractors, etc.). Defined risk thresholds provide criteria to assess operational risks that exist in the course of conducting business.

It is acceptable for risk management practices to be:

  • Quantifiable (objective);
  • Qualifiable (subjective); or
  • A hybrid approach that clearly identifies the subjective and object nature of risk analysis practices.

What is important to keep at the forefront of risk management considerations is the material nature of risk, as it pertains to the organization. Risks that have a material impact include, but are not limited to:

  • Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability & Safety (CIAS) of the organization’s sensitive/regulated data;
  • Supply chain security;
  • Macroeconomic forces;
  • Socio-political changes;
  • Statutory / regulatory changes;
  • Competitive landscape;
  • Diplomatic sanctions (e.g., taxes, customs, embargoes, etc.); and
  • Natural / manmade disasters (e.g., pandemics, war, etc.).
Introduction

Baselining Risk Management Terminology

Risk management involves coordinated activities that optimize the management of potential opportunities and adverse effects. Proactive risk management activities provide a way to realize potential opportunities without exposing an organization to unnecessary peril.

The goal of risk analysis is to determine the potential negative implications of an action or situation to determine one (1) of two (2) decisions:

  • Acceptable Risk: the criteria fall within a range of acceptable parameters; or
  • Unacceptable Risk: The criteria fall outside a range of acceptable parameters.
Acceptable and unacceptable risk tolerance zones

Building upon the graphic shown above, it can be used to view the concept from a risk appetite perspective. For an organization that wants to follow a “moderate risk appetite,” constraints establish allowable and prohibited activities, based on the potential harm to the organization. This defined criteria establishes boundaries for what is acceptable:

Example of a moderate risk appetite

Understanding The Differences Between Risks vs Threats

Risks and threats both tie into cybersecurity and data privacy controls, but it is important to understand the differences:

  • A risk exists due to the absence of or a deficiency with a control; but
  • A threat affects the ability of a control to exist or operate properly.

ComplianceForge published a “threats vs vulnerabilities vs risks” informational graphic that describes the relationship between these components. That informational graphic is shown below:

How threats, vulnerabilities, controls and risks relate to each other

What Is A Risk?

In the context of cybersecurity & data privacy practices, “risk” is defined as:

  • noun A situation where someone or something valued is exposed to danger, harm or loss.
  • verb To expose someone or something valued to danger, harm or loss.

In the context of this definition of risk, it is important to define underlying components of this risk definition:

  • Danger: state of possibly suffering harm or injury.
  • Harm: material / physical damage.
  • Loss: destruction, deprivation or inability to use.

What Is A Threat?

In the context of cybersecurity & data privacy practices, “threat” is defined as:

  • noun A person or thing likely to cause damage or danger.
  • verb To indicate impending damage or danger.
Terminology

Risk Tolerance vs Risk Threshold vs Risk Appetite

Key concepts associated with risk management include:

  • Risk Appetite: The types and amount of risk, on a broad level, an organization is willing to accept in its pursuit of value.
  • Risk Tolerance: The level of risk an entity is willing to assume in order to achieve a desired result.
  • Risk Threshold: Values used to establish concrete decision points and operational control limits to trigger management action and response escalation.

What Is A Risk Appetite?

A risk appetite is a broad “risk management concept” that is used to inform employees about what is and is not acceptable, in terms of risk management from an organization's executive leadership team.

A risk appetite does not contain granular risk management criteria and is primarily a “management statement” that is subjective in nature. Similar in concept to how a policy is a "high-level statement of management intent," an organization's defined risk appetite is a high-level statement of how all, or certain types of, risk are willing to be accepted.

Examples of an organization stating its risk appetite from basic to more complex statements:

  • "[organization name] is a low-risk organization and will avoid any activities that could harm its customers."
  • "[organization name] will aggressively pursue innovative solutions through Research & Development (R&D) to provide industry-leading products and services to our clients, while maintaining a Moderate Risk Appetite. Developing breakthrough products and services does invite potential risk through changes to traditional supply chains, disruptions to business operations and changing client demand. Proposed business practices that pose greater than a Moderate Risk will be considered on a case-by-case basis for financial, operational and legal implications.”

It is important to point out that in many immature risk programs, risk appetite statements are divorced from reality. Executive leaders mean well when they issue risk appetite statements, but the Business As Usual (BAU) practices routinely violate the risk appetite. This is often due to numerous reasons that include, but are not limited to:

  • Technical debt;
  • Dysfunctional management decisions;
  • Insecure practices;
  • Inadequate funding/resourcing;
  • Improperly scoped support contracts (e.g., Managed Service Providers (MSPs), consultants, vendors, etc.); and
  • Lack of pre-production security testing.

What Is A Risk Tolerance?

Risk tolerance is based on objective criteria, unlike the subjective, conceptual nature of a risk appetite. Defining objective criteria is a necessary step to be able to categorize risk on a graduated scale. Establishing objective criteria to quantify the impact of a risk enables risk assessments to leverage that same criteria and assist decision-makers in their risk management decisions (e.g., accept, mitigate, transfer or avoid).

From a graduated scale perspective, it is possible to define "tolerable" risk criteria to create five (5) useful categories of risk:

  • Low Risk;
  • Moderate Risk;
  • High Risk;
  • Severe Risk; and
  • Extreme Risk.

There are two (2) objective criteria that go into defining what constitutes a low, moderate, high, severe or Extreme Risk includes:

  • Impact Effect (IE); and
  • Occurrence Likelihood (OL).
Risk matrix of likelihood and impact

The six (6) categories of IE are:

  • Insignificant (e.g., organization-defined little-to-no impact to business operations);
  • Minor (e.g., organization-defined minor impacts to business operations);
  • Moderate (e.g., organization-defined moderate impacts to business operations);
  • Major (e.g., organization-defined major impacts to business operations);
  • Critical (e.g., organization-defined critical impacts to business operations); and
  • Catastrophic (e.g., organization-defined catastrophic impacts to business operations).

The six (6) categories of OL are:

  • Remote possibility (e.g., <1% chance of occurrence);
  • Highly unlikely (e.g., from 1% to 10% chance of occurrence);
  • Unlikely (e.g., from 10% to 25% chance of occurrence);
  • Possible (e.g., from 25% to 70% chance of occurrence);
  • Likely (e.g., from 70% to 99% chance of occurrence); and
  • Almost certain (e.g., >99% chance of occurrence).

There are three (3) general approaches are commonly employed to estimate OL:

  • Relevant historical data;
  • Probability forecasts; and
  • Expert opinion.

An organization's risk tolerance is influenced by several factors that includes, but is not limited to:

  • Statutory, regulatory and contractual compliance obligations (including adherence to privacy principles for ethical data protection practices).
  • Organization-specific threats (natural and manmade).
  • Reasonably expected industry practices.
  • Pressure from competition.
  • Executive management decisions.

Risk tolerance can be thought of in five (5) levels, based on the organization and its operating environment:

Low

Low Risk Tolerance

Organizations that may adopt a Low Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to, those that:

  • Provide products and/or services that are necessary for the population to maintain normalcy in daily life;
  • Exist in a highly regulated industry with explicit cybersecurity and/or data protection requirements;
  • Store, process and/or transmit highly sensitive/regulated data;
  • May be a legitimate target for nation-state actors to disrupt and/or compromise due to the high-value nature of the organization;
  • Have strong executive management support for cybersecurity and data protection practices as part of “business as usual” activities;
  • Maintain a high level of capability maturity for preventative cybersecurity controls to implement “defense in depth” protections across the enterprise;
  • Have a high level of situational awareness (cybersecurity & physical) that includes its supply chain; and
  • Have cyber-related liability insurance.

Organizations that are reasonably expected to operate with a Low Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to:

  • Critical infrastructure;
  • Utilities (e.g., electricity, drinking water, natural gas, sanitation, etc.);
  • Telecommunications (e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), mobile phone carriers, Cloud Service Providers (CSPs), etc.) (high value);
  • Transportation (e.g., airports, railways, ports, tunnels, fuel delivery, etc.);
  • Technology Research & Development (R&D) (high value);
  • Healthcare (high value); and
  • Government institutions:
  • Military;
  • Law enforcement;
  • Judicial system;
  • Financial services (high value); and
  • Defense Industrial Base (DIB) contractors (high value).
Moderate

Moderate Risk Tolerance

Organizations that may adopt a Moderate Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to, those that:

  • Exist in a regulated industry that has specific cybersecurity and/or data protection requirements (e.g., CMMC, PCI DSS, SOX, GLBA, RMF, etc.);
  • Store, process and/or transmit sensitive/regulated data;
  • Have “flow down” requirements from customers that require adherence to certain cybersecurity and/or data protection requirements;
  • Have executive management support for initiatives to secure sensitive / regulated data enclaves;
  • May be a legitimate target for attackers who wish to financially benefit from stolen information or ransom; and
  • Have cyber-related liability insurance.

Organizations that are reasonably expected to operate with a Moderate Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to:

  • Education (e.g., K-12, colleges, universities, etc.);
  • Utilities (e.g., electricity, drinking water, natural gas, sanitation, etc.);
  • Telecommunications (e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), mobile phone carriers, etc.);
  • Transportation (e.g., airports, railways, ports, tunnels, fuel delivery, etc.);
  • Technology services (e.g., Managed Service Providers (MSPs), Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), etc.);
  • Manufacturing (high value);
  • Healthcare;
  • Defense Industrial Base (DIB) contractors and subcontractors;
  • Legal services (e.g., law firms); and
  • Construction (high value).
High

High Risk Tolerance

Organizations that may adopt a High Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to, those that:

  • Exist in an unregulated industry, pertaining to expected cybersecurity and/or data protection practices;
  • Do not store, process and/or transmit sensitive/regulated data;
  • Lack management support for cybersecurity and data protection governance practices; and
  • Do not have cyber-related liability insurance.

Organizations that may choose to operate with a High Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to:

  • Startups;
  • Hospitality industry (e.g., restaurants, hotels, etc.);
  • Construction;
  • Manufacturing; and
  • Personal services.
Severe

Severe Risk Tolerance

Organizations that may adopt a Severe Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to, those that:

  • Exist in an unregulated industry, pertaining to expected cybersecurity and/or data protection practices;
  • Do not store, process and/or transmit sensitive/regulated data;
  • Lack management support for cybersecurity and data protection governance practices; and
  • Do not have cyber-related liability insurance.

Organizations that may choose to operate with a Severe Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to:

  • Startups; and
  • Artificial Intelligence (AI) developers.
Extreme

Extreme Risk Tolerance

Organizations that may adopt an Extreme Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to, those that:

  • Exist in an unregulated industry, pertaining to expected cybersecurity and/or data protection practices;
  • Do not store, process and/or transmit sensitive/regulated data;
  • Lack management support for cybersecurity and data protection governance practices; and
  • Do not have cyber-related liability insurance.

Organizations that may choose to operate with an Extreme Risk Tolerance include, but are not limited to:

  • Startups; and
  • AI developers.

What Is A Risk Threshold?

Risk thresholds are directly tied to risk tolerance and utilize organization-specific criteria (e.g., acceptable and unacceptable parameters). These risk thresholds exist between the different levels of risk tolerance (e.g., between Low Risk and Moderate Risk, between Moderate Risk and High Risk, etc.). By establishing these risk thresholds, it brings the "graduated scale perspective" to life for risk management practices. Risk thresholds are criteria that are unique to an organization:

  • Organization-specific activities / scenarios that could damage the organization’s reputation;
  • Organization specific activities / scenarios that could negatively affect short-term and long-term profitability; and
  • Organization specific activities / scenarios that could impede business operations.

Risk thresholds are entirely unique to each organization, based on several factors that include:

  • Financial stability;
  • Management preferences;
  • Compliance obligations (e.g., statutory, regulatory and/or contractual); and
  • Insurance coverage limits.
Terminology

What Is Materiality?

The SCF defines materiality as, “A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in an organization’s cybersecurity and/or data privacy controls (across its supply chain) where it is probable that reasonable threats will not be prevented or detected in a timely manner that directly, or indirectly, affects assurance that the organization can adhere to its stated risk tolerance.”

The intended usage of materiality is meant to provide relevant context, as it pertains to risk thresholds. This is preferable when compared to relatively hollow risk findings that act more as guidelines than actionable, decision-making criteria. Cybersecurity materiality is meant to act as a "guard rail" for risk management decisions. A material weakness crosses an organization’s risk threshold by making an actual difference to the organization, where systems, applications, services, personnel, the organization and/or third-parties are, or may be, exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.

The SEC, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) lack specificity in defining the criteria for materiality. Therefore, organizations generally have leeway to define it on their own. The lack of authoritative definition for materiality is not unique, since the concept of risk appetite, risk tolerance and risk threshold also suffer from nebulous definitions by statutory and regulatory authorities. For an item to be considered material, the control deficiency, risk, threat or incident (singular or a combination) generally must meet one or more of the following criteria where the potential financial impact is:

  • ≥ 5% of pre-tax income
  • ≥ 0.5% of total assets
  • ≥ 1% of total equity (shareholder value); and/or
  • ≥ 0.5% of total revenue.

With evolving regulatory requirements for public disclosures, it is increasingly important to understand the nuances between material weakness vs material risk vs material threat vs material incident, since they have specific meanings:

Material Weakness

A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in an organization's cybersecurity and/or data privacy controls (across its supply chain) where it is probable that reasonable threats will not be prevented or detected in a timely manner that directly, or indirectly, affects assurance that the organization can adhere to its stated risk tolerance.

  • When there is an existing deficiency (e.g., control deficiency) that poses a material impact, that is a material weakness (e.g., inability to maintain access control, lack of situational awareness to enable the timely identification and response to incidents, lacking pre-production control validation testing, etc.).
  • A material weakness will be identified as part of a gap assessment, audit or assessment as a finding due to one or more control deficiencies.
  • A material weakness should be documented in an organization's Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M), risk register, or similar tracking mechanism used for remediation purposes.

Material Control

When a deficiency, or absence, of a specific control poses a material impact, that control is designated as a material control. A material control is such a fundamental cybersecurity and/or data protection control that:

  • It is not capable of having compensating controls; and
  • Its absence, or failure, exposes an organization to such a degree that it could have a material impact.
Control impact analysis flow to determine a material control

Material Risk

When an identified risk that poses a material impact, that is a material risk. A material risk:

  • Is a quantitative or qualitative scenario where the exposure to danger, harm or loss has a material impact (e.g., significant financial impact, potential class action lawsuit, death related to product usage, etc.); and
  • Should be identified and documented in an organization's "risk catalog" that chronicles the organization's relevant and plausible risks.
Material risk identification flow

Material Threat

When an identified threat poses a material impact, that is a material threat. A material threat:

  • Is a vector that causes damage or danger that has a material impact (e.g., poorly governed Artificial Intelligence (AI) initiatives, nation state hacking operations, dysfunctional internal management practices, etc.); and
  • Should be identified and documented in an organization's "threat catalog" that chronicles the organization's relevant and plausible threats.
Material threat identification flow

Material Incident

When an incident poses a material impact, that is a material incident. A material incident is an occurrence that does or has the potential to:

  • Jeopardize the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and/or Safety (CIAS) of a system, application, service or the data that it processes, stores and/or transmits with a material impact on the organization; and/or
  • Constitute a violation, or imminent threat of violation, of an organization's policies, standards, procedures or acceptable use practices that has a material impact (e.g., malware on sensitive and/or regulated systems, emergent AI actions, illegal conduct, business interruption, etc.).
Material incident identification flow

Historical Context For Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Materiality Usage

For Governance, Risk Management & Compliance (GRC) practitioners, materiality is often relegated to Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) compliance. However, the concept of materiality is much broader than SOX and can be applied as part of risk reporting in any type of conformity assessment. Financial-related materiality definitions focus on investor awareness of third-party practices, not inwardly looking for adherence to an organization's risk tolerance:

  • Per the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), information is material “to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security registered.”
  • Per the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), information is material, “if omitting, misstating or obscuring it could reasonably be expected to influence the decisions that the primary users of general purpose financial statements make on the basis of those financial statements, which provide financial information about a specific reporting entity.”

In legal terms, “material” is defined as something that is relevant and significant:

  • In a lawsuit, "material evidence" is distinguished from totally irrelevant or of such minor importance that the court will either ignore it, rule it immaterial if objected to, or not allow lengthy testimony upon such a matter.
  • A "material breach" of a contract is a valid excuse by the other party not to perform. However, an insignificant divergence from the terms of the contract is not a material breach.
Terminology

Risk Management Options

Traditional risk management practices have four (4) options to address identified risk:

  • Reduce the risk to an acceptable level;
  • Avoid the risk;
  • Transfer the risk to another party; or
  • Accept the risk.

In a mature risk program, the results of risk assessments are evaluated with the organization's risk appetite in consideration. For example, if the organization has a Moderate Risk Appetite and there are several findings in a risk assessment that are High Risk, then action must be taken to reduce the risk. Accepting a High Risk would violate the Moderate Risk Appetite set by management. In reality, which leaves remediation, transferring or avoiding as the remaining three (3) options, since accepting the risk would be prohibited.

Practical Risk Management Example

For an example scenario, a theoretical company is experimenting with Artificial Intelligence (AI) to strengthen its products and/or services. Its long-standing risk appetite is relatively conservative, where the company draws a hard line that any risk over Moderate is unacceptable. Additionally, the company has zero tolerance for any activities that could harm its customers (e.g., physically or financially).

Given the necessary changes to ramp up both talent and technology to put the appropriate solutions in place to meet the company’s deadlines, there are gaps/deficiencies. When the risk management team assesses the associated risks, the results identify a range of risks from High to Extreme. The reason for these results is simply due to the higher likelihood of emergent behaviors occurring from AI that potentially could harm individuals (e.g., catastrophic impact effect). The results were objective and told a compelling story that there is a realistic chance of significant damage to the company’s reputation and financial liabilities from class action lawsuits.

With those results that point to risks exceeding the organization’s risk appetite, it is a management decision on how to proceed. What does the CEO / Board of Directors (BoD) do?

  • Dispense with its long-standing risk appetite for this specific project so that a potentially lucrative business opportunity can exist?
  • Is the AI project cancelled due to the level of risk?
  • If the CEO/BoD proceeds with accepting the risk, is it violating its fiduciary duties, since it is accepting risk that it previously deemed unacceptable? Additionally, would it be considered negligent to accept high, severe or Extreme Risk (e.g., would a rational individual under similar circumstances make the same decision?)?
Risk & Threat Catalogs

SCF Risk & Threat Catalog Use Cases

The SCF contains both a risk and threat catalog. In addition to the risk and threat catalogs, those identified risks and threats are mapped to SCF controls.

Risk Applicability Test

The risk catalog is designed to answer a singular question: What are the risks associated with a control deficiency? (e.g., If the control fails, what risk(s) is the organization exposed to?)

The test to determine the applicability of risks to controls is answered by this question: If the control is deficient, fails, is bypassed or otherwise does not achieve its intended outcome, what adverse consequence or organizational exposure could result? Failure of the control is the proximate cause of the risk(s).

Threat Applicability Test

The threat catalog is designed to answer a singular question: What natural and man-made threats affect control execution? (e.g., If the threat materializes, will the control function as expected?)

The test to determine the applicability of threats to controls is answered by this question: Can this natural or man-made event cause the control to become unavailable, degraded, bypassed, ineffective or otherwise unable to achieve its intended outcome? Threats directly eliminate, damage or degrade a resource needed for the control to operate (e.g., People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF)).

Each control within the SCF is tagged with one (1) of the following applicability designations:

1

Likely

If the control was removed or granted an exception, the risk and/or threat must be documented in an impact statement as part of a risk/threat analysis:

  • Threat Applicability: When it is likely for a threat to materialize, the threat is expected to eliminate, damage or degrade PPTDF required for the control to operate. The threat may be the sole reason for the control to exist.
  • Risk Applicability: When a risk is likely, failure of the applicable control is a proximate cause of this risk. The risk is a first-order consequence, describing the very thing the control exists to prevent, detect, correct or evidence.
2

Possible

If the control was removed or granted an exception, the risk and/or threat should be documented in an impact statement as part of a risk/threat analysis:

  • Threat Applicability: When it is feasible for a threat to materialize, the threat requires a specific scenario to be applicable. For example, certain natural threats apply only to an affected impact zone (e.g., volcano, tsunami, tornadoes, etc.).
  • Risk Applicability: When a risk is possible, control failure contributes to the risk (e.g., second-order consequence).
3

Unlikely

Pertinent to the control, the risk or threat is improbable, but not impossible. When a risk or threat is determined to be unlikely, it is unreasonable for an organization to include in scoping, testing or reporting on a control:

  • Threat Applicability: The threat is not applicable to the control.
  • Risk Applicability: When risk is not applicable to the control.
Business Planning

Summarizing The Integration Of Risk Management & Business Planning

These key concepts of how risk appetite, risk tolerance and risk thresholds interact with strategic, operational and tactical actions and decisions can be visualized in the following graphic:

  • At the strategic layer, where corporate-level actions and decisions are made, the organization’s risk appetite is defined. The scope of the risk appetite can be organization-wide or compartmentalized to provide enhanced granularity.
  • At the operational level, where Line of Business (LOB)-level actions and decisions are made, the organization’s risk tolerance is put into practice. The organization’s risk tolerance is defined by its established risk appetite.
  • At the tactical level, where department / team-level actions and decisions are made, the organization’s risk thresholds are used to provide criteria to assess operational risk. That operational risk must adhere to the organization’s risk tolerance and therefore, its risk appetite.
Risk appetite, tolerance and thresholds across strategic, operational and tactical levels
Business Planning

Risk Management: Strategic Considerations

At this level, corporate-level actions and decisions define the strategic direction of the organization and its approach to risk management practices:

Mission

  • Influences the vision of the organization.
  • Requires a strategy to accomplish.

Vision

  • Inspires personnel to achieve the mission.

Strategy

  • Implements the mission.
  • Quantifies “downstream” objectives for Lines of Business (LOB)
  • Influences the organization’s risk appetite.

Compliance Obligations

  • Affect the strategy.
  • Affect resource prioritization.

Risk Appetite

  • Must support the organization’s strategy.
  • Defines the organization’s risk tolerance.
Business Planning

Risk Management: Operational Considerations

At this level, Line of Business (LOB)-level actions and decisions define the operational management of the organization:

Line of Business (LOB) Objectives

  • Are quantified and prioritized by the organization’s strategy.
  • Influence necessary capability maturity targets.
  • Quantifies “downstream” objectives at the department / team level.

Capability Maturity Targets

  • Are influenced by LOB objectives.
  • Influences resource prioritization.
  • Affects:
  • Processes that are implemented to achieve objectives;
  • Technologies used to support operations;
  • Staffing levels at the department / team level; and
  • Supply chain quality & security (e.g., vendors, suppliers, contractors, consultants, etc.).

Resource Prioritization

  • Creates operational risks.
  • Affects:
  • Processes that are implemented to achieve objectives;
  • Technologies used to support operations;
  • Staffing levels at the department / team level; and
  • Supply chain quality & security (e.g., vendors, suppliers, contractors, consultants, etc.).

Risk Tolerance

  • Is defined by the organization’s risk appetite.
  • Influences LOB objectives.
  • Quantifies the organization’s risk thresholds.
Business Planning

Risk Management: Tactical Considerations

At this level, department / team-level actions and decisions define the tactics used for day-to-day operations:

Department / Team Objectives

  • Are quantified and prioritized by LOB objectives.
  • Affect:
  • Processes that are implemented to achieve objectives;
  • Technologies used to support operations;
  • Staffing levels at the department / team level; and
  • Supply chain quality & security (e.g., vendors, suppliers, contractors, consultants, etc.).

Processes

  • Are affected by:
  • Department / team objectives;
  • Capability maturity targets; and
  • Resource prioritization.
  • Create operational risks.

Technologies

  • Are affected by:
  • Department / team objectives;
  • Capability maturity targets; and
  • Resource prioritization.
  • Create operational risks.

Staffing

  • Are affected by:
  • Department / team objectives;
  • Capability maturity targets; and
  • Resource prioritization.
  • Creates operational risks.

Supply Chain

  • Are affected by:
  • Department / team objectives;
  • Capability maturity targets; and
  • Resource prioritization.
  • Creates operational risks.

Risk Thresholds

  • Provide criteria to assess operational risks.
  • Affect:
  • Processes that are implemented to achieve objectives;
  • Technologies used to support operations;
  • Staffing levels at the department / team level; and
  • Supply chain quality & security (e.g., vendors, suppliers, contractors, consultants, etc.).

Operational Risk

  • Is assessed against the organization’s risk thresholds.
  • Must adhere to the organization’s risk tolerance, where the organization has four (4) options to address identified risks:
  • Reduce the risk to an acceptable level;
  • Avoid the risk;
  • Transfer the risk to another party; or
  • Accept the risk.
The SCR-RMM

Secure, Compliant & Resilient Risk Management Model (SCR-RMM)

The concept of creating the SCR-RMM was to create an efficient methodology to identify, assess, report and mitigate risk. This project was approached from the perspective of asking the question, “How should I manage risk?” and was a collaboration between ComplianceForge and the Secure Controls Framework (SCF).

Risks & Threats Do Not Exist In A Vacuum

Based on the applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations that impact the scope of a risk assessment, an organization is expected to have an applicable set of cybersecurity and data privacy controls to cover those fundamental compliance obligations. That set of controls identifies the in-scope requirements that must be evaluated to determine what risk exists. This is generally considered to be a “gap assessment” where the assessor:

  • Evaluates those controls based on the entity's Threat Catalog to identify current or potential control deficiencies; and
  • Utilize the Risk Catalog to identify the applicable risks, based on the identified control deficiencies.

Therefore, it is vitally important to understand that risks and threats do not exist in a vacuum. If your cybersecurity and data privacy program is appropriately built, you will have a robust controls framework where risks and threats will map directly to controls. Why is this?

  • Controls are central to managing risks, threats procedures and metrics.
  • Risks, threats, metrics and procedures need to map into the controls, which then map to standards and policies.
Controls as the hub connecting policies, standards, procedures, risks, threats, metrics and evidence

In risk management, the old adage is applicable that “the path to hell is paved with good intentions.” Often, risk management personnel are tasked with creating risk assessments and questions to ask without having a centralized set of organization-wide cybersecurity and data privacy controls to work from. This generally leads to risk teams making up risks and asking questions that are not supported by the organization’s policies and standards. For example, an organization is an “ISO shop” that operates an ISO 27002-based Information Security Management System (ISMS) to govern its policies and standards, but its risk team is asking questions about NIST SP 800-53 or NIST SP 800-171 controls that are not applicable to the organization.

This scenario of “making up risks” points to a few security program governance issues:

  • If the need for additional controls to cover risks is legitimate, then the organization is improperly scoped and does not have the appropriate cybersecurity and data privacy controls to address its applicable statutory, regulatory, contractual or industry-expected practices.
  • If the organization is properly scoped, then the risk team is essentially making up requirements that are not supported by the organization’s policies and standards.

Coverage From Start To Finish

The SCR-RMM addresses risk management from how you start building a risk management program through the ongoing risk management practices that are expected within your organization.

SCR-RMM example PDF preview showing the cyber risk management workflow with risk assessment matrices, threat mapping diagrams, control selection flowcharts, and risk scoring tables used in the Secure Controls Framework

The full-size diagram is available as a downloadable PDF.

Step 1

Identify Risk Management Principles

It is necessary to identify one or more risk management principles that will form the basis of how the entity approaches its risk management processes. The alignment with risk management principles must support the entity's policies and standards for risk management objectives.

Common risk frameworks include:

  • NIST SP 800-37 R2 (NIST Risk Management Framework)
  • ISO 31000:2018
  • COSO Enterprise Risk Management 2017

Less common risk frameworks include:

  • ISO/IEC 27005:2022
  • OMB A-123
Step 2

Identify, Implement & Document Critical Dependencies

This is a multi-step process that involves identifying, implementing and documenting the critical dependencies that are necessary to legitimately identify, assess and manage risk:

2A

Risk Management Dependencies

It is vitally important to establish the fundamental risk management dependencies. These dependencies need to be standardized entity-wide or the organization will be hampered by conflicting definitions and expectations:

  • Define the “acceptable risk” threshold for your entity.
  • Define risk Occurrence Likelihood (OL).
  • Define risk Impact Effect (IE).
  • Define risk levels.
  • Define the various levels of entity management who can “sign off” on risk levels.
  • Establish a Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M), risk register or some other method to track risks from identification through remediation.
2B

Technology Dependencies

In order to support risk management processes, it is necessary to establish the technology dependencies that affect risk management decisions:

  • Maintain accurate and current hardware and software inventories.
  • Maintain accurate and current network diagrams.
  • Maintain accurate and current Data Flow Diagrams (DFD).
  • Document the technology dependencies that affect operations (e.g., supporting systems, applications and services).
  • Consistent application of cybersecurity and data privacy controls across the organization.
  • Situational awareness of technology-related across the organization (e.g., vulnerability scanning & patch management levels).
2C

Business Dependencies

In order to support risk management processes, it is necessary to establish the business dependencies that affect risk management decisions:

  • A data classification scheme needs to exist that is consistent across the organization, including an understanding of what constitutes the “crown jewels” of that require enhanced data protection requirements.
  • Business leadership needs to dictate the technology support it requires for business operations to function properly. This enables technology and security leadership to define “what right looks like” from a necessary maturity level for cybersecurity and data privacy controls.
  • A multi-discipline effort is needed to establish and maintain a Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) program that governs the organization’s supply chain. This requires legal, procurement, security, privacy and Line of Business (LOB) involvement.
  • Policies and standards must be uniformly applied across the organization.
  • LOB management needs to ensure its project teams properly document business practices and provide that information to technology, cybersecurity and data privacy personnel in order to ensure a shared understanding of business practices and requirements exists. This information is necessary to build out a Consolidated Security Plan (CSP).
  • Since the LOB “owns” risk management decisions, the organization needs to ensure that those individuals in roles that make risk management decisions are competent and appropriately trained to make risk-related decisions.
Step 3

Formalize Risk Management Practices

Document a formal Risk Management Program (RMP) that supports the entity's policies & standards. The RMP is meant to:

  • Reference the most appropriate industry frameworks to provide a comprehensive and holistic approach to identifying, managing and remediating risks;
  • Incorporate both cybersecurity and data privacy concepts in all stages of asset and data lifecycles; and
  • Document the organization’s program-level guidance that defines the "who, what, why, when & how" about the organization's specific risk management practices.
Step 4

Establish A Risk Catalog

It is necessary to develop a risk catalog that identifies the possible risk(s) that affect the entity. The use case for the risk catalog is to identify the applicable risk(s) associated with a control deficiency. (e.g., if the control fails, what risk(s) is the organization exposed to?). In the context of the SCR-RMM, “risk” is defined as:

noun A situation where someone or something valued is exposed to danger, harm or loss.

verb To expose someone or something valued to danger, harm or loss.

In the context of this definition of risk, it is important to define underlying components of this risk definition:

  • Danger: state of possibly suffering harm or injury
  • Harm: material / physical damage
  • Loss: destruction, deprivation or inability to use

With this understanding of what risk is, the Secure Controls Framework (SCF) leverages a catalog of risks, grouped as follows:

Access Control

  • R-AC-1 Loss of Accountability / Attribution
  • R-AC-2 Excessive or Unauthorized Privilege
  • R-AC-3 Unauthorized Privilege Elevation
  • R-AC-4 Unauthorized Access
  • R-AC-5 Identity Compromise / Impersonation

Asset Management

  • R-AM-1 Loss, Theft or Damage of Assets
  • R-AM-2 Unauthorized Modification / Loss of System Integrity
  • R-AM-3 Unauthorized Retention / Inability to Dispose of Data

Business Continuity

  • R-BC-1 Business / Service Interruption
  • R-BC-2 Data Loss / Integrity Compromise
  • R-BC-3 Reduced Operational Productivity
  • R-BC-4 System / Data Compromise (Technical Vector)
  • R-BC-5 System / Data Compromise (Non-Technical Vector)

Exposure

  • R-EX-1 Revenue Loss
  • R-EX-2 Contractual Default / Termination
  • R-EX-3 Loss of Competitive Advantage
  • R-EX-4 Reputational Harm / Loss of Stakeholder Trust
  • R-EX-5 Regulatory / Legal / Contractual Financial Liability
  • R-EX-6 Exposure from Unaddressed Vulnerabilities
  • R-EX-7 System / Service Compromise
  • R-EX-8 Failure to Achieve Strategic / Mission Objectives
  • R-EX-9 Intellectual Property / Trade Secret Loss
  • R-EX-10 Fraud / Theft / Direct Financial Loss
  • R-EX-11 Loss of Authorization / Certification / License

Governance

  • R-GV-1 Failure to Support Business / Mission Objectives
  • R-GV-2 Unaddressed Security / Compliance Exposure
  • R-GV-3 Unperformed / Unowned Control Responsibilities
  • R-GV-4 Uncontrolled Internal Security / Privacy Exposure
  • R-GV-5 Uncontrolled Third-Party Security / Privacy Exposure
  • R-GV-6 Lack of oversight of internal controls
  • R-GV-7 Lack of oversight of third-party controls
  • R-GV-8 Harm from Illegal, Abusive or Unsafe Content / Conduct
  • R-GV-9 Inability to Demonstrate Due Diligence / Due Care
  • R-GV-10 Unreliable Assurance / Decision Information

Incident Response

  • R-IR-1 Loss of Investigative / Evidentiary Capability
  • R-IR-2 Delayed Containment / Increased Incident Impact
  • R-IR-3 Incident Persistence / Recurrence
  • R-IR-4 Incident Response / Recovery Cost

Operational Resilience

  • R-OR-1 Recovery Failure / Unacceptable Recovery Delay
  • R-OR-2 Concentration / Single-Point Dependency Failure

Situational Awareness

  • R-SA-1 Undetected / Delayed Detection of Adverse Activity
  • R-SA-2 Lack of a security-minded workforce

Supply Chain

  • R-SC-1 Third-Party Cybersecurity Compromise / Exposure
  • R-SC-2 Third-Party Physical Security Disruption / Exposure
  • R-SC-3 Sub-Tier / Fourth-Party Supply Chain Exposure
  • R-SC-4 Third-Party Legal / Compliance Exposure
  • R-SC-5 Harm from Unauthorized / Unintended Product or Service Use
  • R-SC-6 Third-Party Dependency Failure
  • R-SC-7 Counterfeit / Non-Conforming Component Impact

Artificial Intelligence & Autonomous Technologies

  • R-AI-1 AI Output / Decision Integrity Failure
  • R-AI-2 AI Data Confidentiality / Integrity / Provenance Loss
  • R-AI-3 Unauthorized / Harmful Autonomous Action
  • R-AI-4 Sensitive Data / Compliance Exposure from Unsanctioned AI Use
  • R-AI-5 Unintended or Unsafe Technology Behavior
  • R-AI-6 AI Bias / Discriminatory Outcome

Operational Technology (OT)

  • R-OT-1 OT Safety / Process Availability Failure

Information Protection

  • R-IP-1 Long-Term Confidentiality Loss from Cryptographic Obsolescence
  • R-IP-2 Loss of Confidentiality
  • R-IP-3 Loss of Data Integrity
  • R-IP-4 Loss of Data / Service Availability
  • R-IP-5 Loss of Authenticity / Provenance
  • R-IP-6 Privacy Harm / Unauthorized Processing

Safety

  • R-SF-1 Injury / Loss of Life
  • R-SF-2 Physical / Environmental Damage

Personnel

  • R-PE-1 Loss of Critical Knowledge / Capability

The full catalog, including the description of each entry, is in the SCF workbook.

Step 5

Establish A Threat Catalog

It is necessary to develop a threat catalog that identifies possible natural and man-made threats that affect the entity's cybersecurity & data privacy controls. The use case for the threat catalog is to identify applicable natural and man-made threats that affect control execution. (e.g., if the threat materializes, will the control function as expected?) In the context of the SCR-RMM, “threat” is defined as:

noun A person or thing likely to cause damage or danger.

verb To indicate impending damage or danger.

This threat catalog is sorted by natural and man-made threats:

Natural Threats

Natural threats are caused by environmental phenomena that have the potential to impact individuals, processes, organizations or society, as a whole. The SCR-RMM leverages a catalog of fourteen (14) natural threats:

NT-1 Drought & Water Shortage
NT-2 Earthquakes
NT-3 Fire & Wildfires
NT-4 Floods
NT-5 Hurricanes & Tropical Storms
NT-6 Landslides & Debris Flow
NT-7 Pandemic (Disease) Outbreaks
NT-8 Severe Weather
NT-9 Space Weather
NT-10 Thunderstorms & Lightning
NT-11 Tornadoes
NT-12 Tsunamis
NT-13 Volcanoes
NT-14 Winter Storms & Extreme Cold

Manmade Threats

Manmade threats are caused by an element of human intent, negligence or error, or threat of violence that have the potential to impact individuals, processes, organizations or society, as a whole. The SCR-RMM leverages a catalog of thirty-one (31) manmade threats:

MT-1 Civil or Political Unrest
MT-2 Malicious Cyber Activity
MT-3 Hazardous Materials Emergencies
MT-4 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons
MT-5 Physical Crime
MT-6 Terrorism & Armed Attacks
MT-7 Utility Service Disruption
MT-8 Dysfunctional Management Practices
MT-9 Human Error
MT-10 Technical / Mechanical Failure
MT-11 Statutory / Regulatory / Contractual Change
MT-12 Data Quality Degradation / Data Poisoning
MT-13 Artificial Intelligence & Autonomous Technologies (AAT) System Failure or Unintended Behavior
MT-14 Fraud, Corruption and/or Intentional Criminal Conduct
MT-15 Conflict of Interest (COI) / Undue Influence / Insider Misconduct
MT-16 Economic Shock / Market Disruption
MT-17 Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI)
MT-18 Geopolitical Conflict / Government Intervention
MT-19 Sanctions / Trade Restriction Disruption
MT-20 Counterfeit / Non-Conforming Products
MT-21 Hazardous / Degraded Operational Environment
MT-22 Manufacturing Capacity / Supply Disruption
MT-23 Product Defect / Design Failure
MT-24 Supplier Financial Distress / Insolvency
MT-25 Workforce Shortage / Loss of Critical Skills / Labor Disruption
MT-26 Transportation / Logistics Disruption
MT-27 Infrastructure Failure / Degradation
MT-28 Harvest Now / Decrypt Later (HNDL)
MT-29 Adversarial Artificial Intelligence (AI) Attack
MT-30 Operational Technology (OT) / Industrial Control System (ICS) Attack
MT-31 Cryptographic Compromise / Cryptanalytic Capability Advancement

The full catalog, including the description of each entry, is in the SCF workbook.

Step 6

Establish A Controls Catalog

It is necessary to develop a catalog of cybersecurity and data privacy controls that addresses the organization's applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations. Risks used by the organization as part of risk analysis processes must map to the organization's existing cybersecurity & data privacy controls. Ideally, the controls are weighted since not all cybersecurity & data privacy controls are equal, in terms of impact or consequence.

Note

The first order of control selection is to determine “must have” obligations from applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations to define baseline minimums. The second order of control selection is to determine discretionary requirements that are necessary to address organization-specific threats and risks. The SCR-RMM is designed to help determine risks and threat applicability as:

  • Likely;
  • Possible; and
  • Unlikely.
Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) vs Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR)

To assist in this process, it is helpful for the organization to categorize its applicable controls according to “must have” vs “nice to have” requirements:

  • Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) are the absolute minimum requirements that must be addressed to comply with applicable laws, regulations and contracts.
  • Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) are tied to the organization’s risk appetite since DSR are “above and beyond” MCR, where the organization self-identifies additional cybersecurity and data protection controls to address voluntary industry practices or internal requirements, such as findings from internal audits or risk assessments.

Secure and compliant operations exist when both MCR and DSR are implemented and properly governed:

  • MCR are primarily externally-influenced, based on industry, government, state and local regulations. MCR should never imply adequacy for secure practices and data protection, since they are merely compliance-related.
  • DSR are primarily internally-influenced, based on the organization’s respective industry and risk tolerance. While MCR establishes the foundational floor that must be adhered to, DSR are where organizations often achieve improved efficiency, automation and enhanced security.

The combination of MCR and DSR equate to an organization’s Minimum Security Requirements (MSR), which define the “must have” and “nice to have” requirements for People, Processes, Technologies, Data & Facilities (PPTDFF) in one control set. It defines the Minimum Viable Product (MVP) technical and business requirements from a cybersecurity and data privacy perspective. In short, the MSR can be considered to be an organization’s IT General Controls (ITGC), which establishes the basic controls that must be applied to systems, applications, services, processes and data throughout the enterprise. ITGC provides the foundation of assurance for an organization’s decision makers. ITGC enables an organization’s governance function to define how technologies are designed, implemented and operated.

Commensurate with risk, cybersecurity and data privacy measures must be implemented to guard against unauthorized access to, alteration, disclosure or destruction of data and systems, applications and services. This also includes protection against accidental loss or destruction. The security of systems, applications and services must include controls and safeguards to offset possible threats, as well as controls to ensure Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Safety (CIAS):

Confidentiality

Confidentiality addresses preserving restrictions on information access and disclosure so that access is limited to only authorized users and services.

Integrity

Integrity addresses the concern that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner.

Availability

Availability addresses ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

Safety

Safety addresses reducing risk associated with embedded technologies that could fail or be manipulated by nefarious actors.

Note

The SCF has built-In Control Weighting Values [1-10], a maturity model and the SCF controls written in question format.

Step 7

Define Capability Maturity Model (CMM) Targets

It is necessary for an entity to define “what right looks like” for the level of maturity it expects for deployed cybersecurity and data privacy controls. This is generally defined by aligning with a Capability Maturity Model (CMM). While there are several to choose from, the SCF’s Secure, Compliant & Resilient Capability Maturity Model (SCR-CMM) contains control-level criteria for each of the levels of the maturity model.

Maturity model criteria should be used by the organization as the benchmark to evaluate cybersecurity and data privacy controls.

Capability maturity sweet spot chart showing cost and complexity by SCR-CMM level
Step 8

Define Assessment Rigor

With the previous steps addressed, an assessor will leverage those deliverables (e.g., Risk Management Program (RMP), threat catalog, risk catalog, controls catalogs, etc.) to implement a functional capability to assess risk across the entity. That documented assessment criteria from the previous steps exist to guide the assessor when performing risk assessments.

This risk assessment approach applies to various assessment scenarios:

  • Cybersecurity Risk Assessment;
  • Third-Party Risk Assessment;
  • Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA);
  • Business Impact Assessment (BIA); and
  • Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA).

There are three (3) levels of rigor for a risk assessment:

  • Standard;
  • Enhanced; and
  • Comprehensive.

The definition of each assessment method includes types of objects to which the method can be applied. In addition, the application of each method is described in terms of the attributes of depth and coverage.

  • The depth attribute addresses the rigor and level of detail of the assessment.
  • The coverage attribute addresses the scope or breadth of the assessment.
8A

Standard Rigor
(Low Assurance)

Standard rigor assessments provide a level of understanding of the administrative, technical and physical cybersecurity and/or data protection measures necessary for determining whether the applicable controls are:

  • Implemented; and
  • Free of obvious errors.

Standard rigor represents sufficient due care in the evaluation of cybersecurity and/or data protection controls. Standard rigor is appropriate for the Manual Point In Time (MPIT) assessment methodology that:

  • Is relevant to a specific point in time (time at which the controls were evaluated); and
  • Relies on the manual review of artifacts to derive a finding.
8B

Enhanced Rigor
(Moderate Assurance)

Enhanced rigor assessments provide a level of understanding of the administrative, technical and physical cybersecurity and/or data protection measures necessary for determining whether:

  • The applicable controls are:
  • Implemented; and
  • Free of obvious/apparent errors; and
  • There are increased grounds for confidence that the applicable controls are:
  • Implemented correctly; and
  • Operating as intended.

Enhanced rigor is appropriate for the Automated Point In Time (APIT) assessment methodology that utilizes automation to augment a traditional assessment methodology, where Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Technologies (AAT) are used to compare the desired state of conformity versus the current state via machine-readable configurations and/or assessment evidence:

  • Is relevant to a specific point in time (time at which the controls were evaluated);
  • In situations where technology cannot evaluate evidence, evidence is manually reviewed; and
  • The combined output of automated and manual reviews of artifacts is used to derive a finding.
8C

Comprehensive Rigor
(High Assurance)

Comprehensive rigor assessments provide a level of understanding of the administrative, technical and physical cybersecurity and/or data protection measures necessary for determining:

  • Whether the applicable controls are:
  • Implemented; and
  • Free of obvious/apparent errors;
  • Whether there are further increased grounds for confidence that the applicable controls are:
  • Implemented correctly; and
  • Operating as intended on an ongoing and consistent basis; and
  • There is support for continuous improvement in the effectiveness of the applicable controls.

Comprehensive rigor is appropriate for the Automated Evidence with Human Review (AEHR) assessment methodology that is used for ongoing, continuous control assessments:

  • AAT continuously evaluates controls by comparing the desired state of conformity versus the current state through machine-readable configurations and/or assessment evidence; and
  • Recurring human reviews:
  • Evaluate the legitimacy of the results from automated control assessments; and
  • Validate the automated evidence review process to derive a finding.
Step 9

Establish The Context For Assessing Risks

Now that a methodology exists to assess risk, it is necessary for the assessor to establish the context of the Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Risk Environment (SPRE). The SPRE is the overall operating environment that is in scope for the risk assessment. This is where applicable threats, risks and vulnerabilities affect the entity’s protection measures.

An assessor can generally find this information in a well-documented Consolidated Security Plan (CSP). If the scoping is incorrect, the context will likely also be incorrect, which can lead to a misguided and inaccurate risk assessment.

Context establishment includes identifying whether Operational Technology (OT) is in scope. OT assets change the assessment, where safety takes priority over confidentiality, Impact Effect (IE) scoring reflects physical consequences and test methods are constrained to passive techniques unless documented engineering approval exists (see NIST SP 800-82 R3 and the IEC 62443 series of standards).

SPRE context and the matching CSP components:

Background Information

  • General description & purpose
  • Applicable statutory, regulatory & contractual requirements
  • Applicable contracts
  • Stakeholders (internal & external)
  • Unique data protection considerations

System Environment Description

  • Hardware & software in use
  • Geolocation considerations
  • Identity & Access Management (IAM)
  • Network boundaries
  • Supply chain overview
  • Ongoing maintenance & support plan

Without specific statutory, regulatory or contractual scoping instructions, the organization should leverage the Unified Scoping Guide (USG) as the basis for scoping sensitive and/or regulated data.

Assessment boundary scoping
Step 10

Conformity Assessment (Controls Gap Assessment)

Based on the applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations that impact the SPRE, the entity is expected to have an applicable set of controls to cover those needs. That set of controls identifies the in-scope requirements that must be evaluated to determine the organization’s conformity against that specified control set.

The assessor leverages Assessment Objectives (AOs) to perform a conformity assessment against the designated cybersecurity & data protection controls. The AOs provide objective criteria that must be satisfied to legitimately determine whether the control is implemented and operating as intended.

Note

There may be multiple AOs associated with a control. The SCF spreadsheet contains an AO catalog, tied to SCF controls.

Step 11

Control Assessment Methods & Findings

The process of assessing controls (including AOs) involves determining the most appropriate assessment method, the methodology that will be used to assess controls and a way to report on the resulting findings. This section covers those topics.

Assessment Methods

Assessors are expected to review artifacts and other evidence to independently verify that an organization meets the AO for all applicable controls. There are three (3) assessment methods:

  • Examine;
  • Interview; and
  • Test.

Two practical notes apply:

  • For production OT environments, Test activities default to passive and read-only techniques, with active testing gated behind documented engineering approval and coordinated maintenance windows; and
  • Automated, recurring evidence collection aligned with NIST SP 800-137A can supplement the three (3) methods for controls that support continuous monitoring.

Examine

The process of checking, inspecting, reviewing, observing, studying or analyzing one or more assessment objects to facilitate understanding, achieve clarification or obtain evidence.

Interview

The process of conducting discussions with individuals or groups in an organization to facilitate understanding, achieve clarification or lead to the location of evidence.

Test

The process of exercising one or more assessment objects under specified conditions to compare actual with expected behavior.

When the control deficiencies are identified, the assessor must utilize an entity-accepted method to assess the risk in the most objective method possible. Criteria for assessing a control for deficiencies is generally defined as either:

  • Qualitative;
  • Semi-Qualitative; or
  • Quantitative

In most cases, it is not feasible to have an entirely quantitative assessment, so assessments should be expected to include semi-qualitative or qualitative aspects. There are multiple methods to actually assess and calculate risk. The SCR-RMM simplifies risk management practices by utilizing a form of risk matrix that takes Occurrence Likelihood (OL) and Impact Effect (IE) into account to determine the risk categorization.

Methodologies

There are three (3) options to implement assessment methods:

  • Manual Point In Time (MPIT);
  • Automated Point In Time (APIT); and
  • Automated Evidence with Human Review (AEHR).

Manual Point In Time (MPIT)

MPIT is a traditional assessment methodology that:

  • Is relevant to a specific point in time (time at which the controls were evaluated); and
  • Relies on the manual review of artifacts to derive a finding.

Automated Point In Time (APIT)

APIT utilizes automation to augment a traditional assessment methodology, where Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Technologies (AAT) are used to compare the desired state of conformity versus the current state via machine-readable configurations and/or assessment evidence:

  • Is relevant to a specific point in time (time at which the controls were evaluated);
  • In situations where technology cannot evaluate evidence, evidence is manually reviewed; and
  • The combined output of automated and manual reviews of artifacts is used to derive a finding.

Automated Evidence with Human Review (AEHR)

AEHR is used for ongoing, continuous control assessments:

  • AAT continuously evaluates controls by comparing the desired state of conformity versus the current state through machine-readable configurations and/or assessment evidence; and
  • Recurring human reviews:
  • Evaluate the legitimacy of the results from automated control assessments; and
  • Validate the automated evidence review process to derive a finding.

Assessment Findings

When a control is assessed, the result is referred to as a finding. Findings are not designed to have a specific “score” associated with the evaluation of a control. Its value is in the subjective status associated with the implementation of the control. These findings are useful for the Report on Conformity (ROC), or whatever you want to call the risk assessment report, to summarize the findings to the organization’s management.

The four (4) categories of findings are:

  • Satisfactory;
  • Not Applicable;
  • Compensating Control; and
  • Deficient.

Satisfactory

Positive finding. Appropriate evidence of due diligence and due care exists to demonstrate the design and/or operation of an organization’s cybersecurity and/or data protection control satisfactorily meets all applicable Assessment Objectives (AOs) that determine if the intent of the control is achieved.

Not Applicable

Neutral finding. Appropriate evidence demonstrates the control is not applicable, due to applicable business practices and/or technical implementation.

Compensating Control

Positive finding. Appropriate evidence of due diligence and due care exists to demonstrate the design and/or operation of an organization’s cybersecurity and/or data protection control satisfactorily meets all applicable AOs that determine if the intent of the control is achieved.

Deficient

Negative finding. A “deficiency” exists when the design and/or operation of an organization’s cybersecurity and/or data protection control fails to meet one of more AO that determines if the intent of the control is achieved.

Step 12

Determine Risk Exposure

Based on deficient controls identified in the previous step, it is necessary to determine the organization’s exposure to risk, since the control deficiency(ies) creates risk (e.g., a situation where someone or something valued is exposed to danger, harm or loss).

Note

Determining risk exposure can be calculated at an individual level and averaged across multiple deficiencies.

The SCR-RMM leverages the following five (5) categories of risk:

  • Low;
  • Moderate;
  • High;
  • Severe; and
  • Extreme.

These categories of risk are determined through an intersection of:

  • Impact Effect (IE); and
  • Occurrence Likelihood (OL)
Risk matrix of likelihood and impact
12A

Impact Effect (IE)

The six (6) categories of IE are:

  • Insignificant (e.g., organization-defined little-to-no impact to business operations);
  • Minor (e.g., organization-defined minor impacts to business operations);
  • Moderate (e.g., organization-defined moderate impacts to business operations);
  • Major (e.g., organization-defined major impacts to business operations);
  • Critical (e.g., organization-defined critical impacts to business operations); and
  • Catastrophic (e.g., organization-defined catastrophic impacts to business operations).
12B

Occurrence Likelihood (OL)

The six (6) categories of OL are:

  • Remote possibility (e.g., <1% chance of occurrence);
  • Highly unlikely (e.g., from 1% to 10% chance of occurrence);
  • Unlikely (e.g., from 10% to 25% chance of occurrence);
  • Possible (e.g., from 25% to 70% chance of occurrence);
  • Likely (e.g., from 70% to 99% chance of occurrence); and
  • Almost certain (e.g., >99% chance of occurrence).

There are three (3) general approaches are commonly employed to estimate OL:

  • Relevant historical data;
  • Probability forecasts; and
  • Expert opinion.
12C

Inherent Risk

From the risk assessment matrix, the intersection between OL and IE will provide the inherent risk score. This is considered a raw or unmitigated risk score. It is important to note that inherent risk does not take into account any control weighting, the maturity of implemented controls or any other mitigating factors.

12D

Residual Risk

Residual risk takes into account control weighting, the maturity of implemented controls and other mitigating factors where it builds upon the inherent risk calculation. To identify the residual risk score, OL is calculated by IE, Control Weighting (CW), Maturity Level (ML) and Mitigating Factors (MF). See Appendix A for more details on calculating residual risk.

Step 13

Prioritize & Document Identified Deficiencies

Once a deficiency with a control is identified, it is necessary to determine the level of urgency that should be applied to it. Findings need to be categorized by one of the following levels of prioritization:

  • Emergency;
  • Elevated; or
  • Standard.

The organization’s risk documentation methodology should utilize one or more of the following options:

  • Risk Register
  • Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M)
  • Risk Assessment Report
  • Consolidated Security Plan (CSP); or
  • Another documentation option of your choosing.
Step 14

Risk Determination: Report on Conformity (ROC)

Risk management requires educating stakeholders for situational awareness and decision-making purposes. There are many options and formats available to report, but this can be considered a Report on Conformity (ROC). The reason for this is a risk assessment fundamentally is evaluating if an organization’s cybersecurity and data privacy practices support its stated risk tolerance.

This approach can be summarized by reporting to the organization’s management on the “health” of the assessed controls by one of the following four (4) risk determinations:

  • Strictly Conforms;
  • Conforms;
  • Significant Deficiency; and
  • Material Weakness.
Flow from assessment findings to a Report on Conformity
14A

Strictly Conforms

This is a positive outcome and indicates that at a high-level, the organization’s cybersecurity and data privacy practices conform to its selected cybersecurity and data privacy practices. Strictly Conforms means:

  • The organization/LOB can demonstrate Strict Conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls, where one hundred percent (100%) of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
  • The controls are met and operational;
  • Any control designated as Not Applicable (N/A) is validated as such by the assessor; and/or
  • Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
  • Applicable;
  • Reasonable; and
  • Implemented and operating properly; and
  • Assessed controls provide reasonable assurance that the organization’s/LOB’s cybersecurity and data protection program provides adequate security, where it:
  • Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
  • Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks;
  • Is designed to detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and
  • Is prepared to respond to material incidents.

Strictly Conforms is a statement to the organization’s management that sufficient evidence of due care and due diligence exists to assure that the organization’s stated risk tolerance can be achieved.

14B

Conforms

This is a positive outcome and indicates that at a high-level, the organization’s cybersecurity and data privacy practices conform to its selected cybersecurity and data privacy practices. Conforms means:

  • The organization/LOB can demonstrate Conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls, where at least eighty percent (80%) of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
  • The controls are met and operational;
  • Any control designated as Not Applicable (N/A) is validated as such by the assessor; and/or
  • Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
  • Applicable;
  • Reasonable; and
  • Implemented and operating properly; and
  • Any assessed control deficiency is not material to the organization’s/LOB’s cybersecurity and data protection program; and
  • Assessed controls provide reasonable assurance that the organization’s/LOB’s cybersecurity and data protection program provides adequate security, where it:
  • Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
  • Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks;
  • Is designed to detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and
  • Is prepared to respond to material incidents.

Conforms is a statement to the organization’s management that sufficient evidence of due care and due diligence exists to assure that the organization’s stated risk tolerance can be achieved.

14C

Significant Deficiency

This is a negative outcome and indicates the organization was unable to demonstrate conformity with its selected cybersecurity and data privacy practices, due to systematic problems. Significant Deficiency means:

  • The organization/LOB can demonstrate limited conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls due to a systemic problem within the organization’s cybersecurity and data protection program, where:
  • At least seventy percent (70%), but less than eighty percent (80%), of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
  • The controls are met and operational;
  • Any control designated as N/A is validated as such by the assessor; and/or
  • Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
  • Applicable;
  • Reasonable; and
  • Implemented and operating properly;
  • Any assessed control deficiency is not material to the organization's cybersecurity and data protection program;
  • Assessed controls do not provide reasonable assurance that the organization’s cybersecurity and data protection program provides adequate security, where it:
  • Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
  • Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks;
  • Is designed to detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and
  • Is prepared to respond to material incidents; and
  • The organization’s cybersecurity and data protection program:
  • Has systemic problems inherent in the overall function of a team, department, project, application, service and/or vendor rather than a specific, isolated factor; and
  • Requires implementing limited changes to personnel, technology and/or practices to correct the design and implementation of deficient cybersecurity and/or data protection controls.

Significant Deficiency is a statement to the organization’s management that insufficient evidence of due care and due diligence exists to assure that the organization’s stated risk tolerance is achieved, due to a systemic problem in the cybersecurity and/or privacy program.

In the context of a significant deficiency, a systemic problem is a consequence of issues inherent in the overall function (e.g., team, department, project, application, service, vendor, etc.), rather than a specific, isolated factor. Systemic errors may require changing the structure, personnel, technology and/or practices to remediate the significant deficiency.

14D

Material Weakness

This is a negative outcome and indicates the organization is unable to demonstrate conformity with its selected cybersecurity and data privacy practices, due to deficiencies that make it probable that reasonable-expected threats will not be prevented or detected in a timely manner that directly, or indirectly, affects assurance that the organization can adhere to its stated risk tolerance. Material Weakness means:

  • The organization/LOB cannot demonstrate conformity with its selected cybersecurity and/or data protection controls due to deficiencies that make it probable that reasonably expected threats will not be promptly detected or prevented, where:
  • One (1), or more, material controls is/are deficient; and/or
  • Less than seventy percent (70%) of the assessed controls have reasonable evidence to conclude:
  • The controls are met and operational;
  • Any control designated as N/A is validated by the assessor and confirmed as such; and/or
  • Where applicable, compensating controls are validated by the assessor as being:
  • Applicable;
  • Reasonable; and
  • Implemented and operating properly;
  • Assessed controls do not provide reasonable assurance that the organization’s cybersecurity and data protection program adequately:
  • Adheres to a defined and documented risk tolerance;
  • Mitigates material cybersecurity and/or data protection risks; and/or
  • Possesses the capability to:
  • Detect and protect against material cybersecurity and/or data protection threats; and/or
  • Respond to material incidents; and
  • The organization's cybersecurity and data protection program:
  • Cannot perform its stated mission; and
  • Drastic changes to people, processes and/or technologies are required to remediate the deficiencies.

Material Weakness is a statement to the organization’s management that (1) the cybersecurity and/or privacy program is incapable of successfully performing its stated mission and (2) drastic changes to people, processes and/or technology are necessary to remediate the findings.

Step 15

Identify The Appropriate Management Audience

It is critically important that as part of an entity’s program to manage risk that various levels of management are identified with varying authority, each with a pre-described ability to make risk management decisions. This helps prevent low-level managers from recklessly accepting risks that should be reserved for more senior management. A common tiered structure for risk management decisions includes:

  • Line Management;
  • Senior Management;
  • Executive Management; and
  • Board of Directors.

The organization’s RMP defines the specific risk authority that roles have to make risk management decisions.

Step 16

Management Determines Risk Treatment

Risk management is a management decision:

  • Cybersecurity and IT generally do not “own” identified risk.
  • The ultimate responsibility is on the management structure of the team/department/LOB that “owns” the business process or technology that is in use.

Common risk treatment options available to an organization’s management team include:

  • Reducing the risk to an acceptable level;
  • Avoiding the risk;
  • Transferring the risk to another party (e.g., insurance, outsourcing, etc.); and
  • Accepting the risk.
  • For cryptographic obsolescence risks, risk reduction takes the form of cryptographic agility:
  • Maintaining a cryptographic inventory;
  • Prioritizing systems that protect data with long confidentiality lifetimes; and
  • Migrating to FIPS 203 / 204 / 205 algorithms on a schedule that beats the NIST IR 8547 timeline (deprecation of quantum-vulnerable algorithms by 2030, disallowance after 2035).
Step 17

Cybersecurity & Data Protection Practitioners Implement & Document Risk Treatment

When managing risk, it should be kept as simple as possible. Realistically, risk treatment is either “open” or “closed” but it can sometimes be useful to provide more granularity into open items to assist in reporting on risk management activities:

  • Open (unacceptable risk);
  • Open (acceptable risk); and
  • Closed.
Errata

Errata

The 2026.2 release:

  • Added new risk catalog entries
  • Added new manmade threat entries
  • Added OT scoping and assessment constraints to Steps 9 and 11;
  • Updated references from System Security Plan (SSP) to Consolidated Security Plan (CSP) per NIST SP 800-18 R2
  • Added cryptographic agility guidance to Step 16; and
  • Added a cross-reference to the SCF publication Structured Approach to Quantum Security: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) & Zero Trust Network Architecture (ZTNA).

The 2026.1 release rebranded the Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Risk Management Model (C|P-RMM) to the Secure, Compliant & Resilient Risk Management Model (SCR-RMM).

The 2025.2 release edited the following sections of the SCR-RMM:

  • Wordsmithed the section “Understanding the differences between: Risk Tolerance vs Risk Threshold vs Risk Appetite” for readability.
  • Step 8: adjusted the assurance label for Standard Rigor from “minimal assurance” to “low assurance.”
  • Wordsmithed Appendix B to reflect the updated assurance label for Standard Rigor.
  • Updated Appendix C to address NIST SP 800-161 R1 and NIST SP 800-171 R3.
  • Added Appendix E to address control applicability.
Appendices

Appendices

The SCR-RMM includes five appendices with supporting reference material. Each one is summarized below, and the full content is in the SCR-RMM PDF.

  • Appendix A: Calculating Inherent Risk vs Residual Risk. A straightforward method to calculate inherent and residual risk with the SCR-RMM, accounting for control weighting, maturity level targets and mitigating factors (OL * IE * CW * ML * MF).
  • Appendix B: Reporting Risk Findings. How the concepts of assurance, conformity and materiality apply to risk findings, including the Examine, Interview and Test criteria for standard, enhanced and comprehensive rigor.
  • Appendix C: NIST SP 800-161 & NIST SP 800-171 Risk Management Considerations. The risk management controls in NIST SP 800-161 R1, NIST SP 800-171 R2 and NIST SP 800-171 R3.
  • Appendix D: Documentation To Support Risk Management Practices. The hierarchical documentation that supports risk management, including policies, standards and procedures, a Risk Management Program (RMP), a C-SCRM Strategy & Implementation Plan and a C-SCRM Plan.
  • Appendix E: Cybersecurity Control Applicability. How the People, Processes, Technology, Data, Facilities & Artificial Intelligence (PPTDF-AI) model helps determine where controls apply.
SCF Ecosystem

SCR-RMM Works With The SCF Ecosystem

The SCR-RMM draws on other free SCF content for controls, maturity targets and scoping.

SCF Controls

Step 6 builds the controls catalog. The SCF's 1,500+ controls carry weighting values from 1 to 10, and the SCF workbook holds the Assessment Objectives (AOs) for Step 10 and the current catalogs.

SCR-CMM

Step 7 uses the SCR-CMM's control-level maturity criteria as the benchmark to evaluate controls. Control maturity is also a factor in residual risk (Step 12D).

Unified Scoping Guide (USG)

Step 9 uses the USG as the basis for scoping sensitive and regulated data when no law, regulation or contract gives scoping instructions.