STRM Guidance:

NIST IR 8477-Based Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM) NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1 Focal Document:

Focal Document URL: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final **Reference Document:** Secure Controls Framework (SCF) version 2025.1 https://securecontrolsframework.com/set-theory-relationship-mapping-strm/ **Published STRM URL:** https://securecontrolsframework.com/content/strm/scf-strm-general-nist-800-218.pdf

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship Notes (optional) (optional)
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance	CPL-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.	Example 1: Define policies for securing software development infrastructures and their components, including development endpoints, throughout the SDLC an maintaining that security. Example 2: Define policies for securing software development processes throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security, including for open-source and other third-party software components utilized by software being developed. Example 3: Review and update security requirements at least annually, or sooner if there are new requirements fror internal or external sources, or a major security incident targeting software development infrastructure has occurred. Example 4: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to requirements
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Compliance Scope	CPL-01.2	Mechanisms exist to document and validate the scope of cybersecurity & data privacy controls that are determined to meet statutory, regulatory and/or contractual compliance obligations.	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Requirements Definition	PRM-05	Mechanisms exist to identify critical system components and functions by performing a criticality analysis for critical systems, system components or services at pre-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Management	PRM-07	Mechanisms exist to ensure changes to systems within the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) are controlled through formal change control procedures.	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP).	е
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	malformed software. Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its systems, processes and data.	
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Requirements Definition	PRM-05	Mechanisms exist to identify critical system components and functions by performing a criticality analysis for critical systems, system components or services at pre-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).	Example 1: Define policies that specify risk-based software architecture and design requirements, such as making code modular to facilitate code reuse and updates; isolating security components from other components during execution; avoiding undocumented commands and settings; and providing features that will aid software acquirers with the secure deployment, operation, and maintenance of the software. Example 2: Define policies that specify the security requirements for the organization's software, and verify compliance at key points in the SDLC (e.g., classes of software flaws verified by gates, responses to vulnerabilitied discovered in released software). Example 3: Analyze the risk of applicable technology stacks (e.g., languages, environments, deployment models), and recommend or require the use of stacks that will reduce riscompared to others. Example 4: Define policies that specify what needs to be archived for each software release (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation, data inventory) and how long it needs to be retained based on the SDLC model, software end-of-life, and other factors. Example 5: Ensure that policies cover the entire software lit cycle, including notifying users of the impending end of software support and the date of software end-of-life. Example 6: Review all security requirements at least annually, or sooner if there are new requirements from internal or external sources, a major vulnerability is discovered in released software, or a major security incident targeting organization-developed software has
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP).	e
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	



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PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Subset Of	Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance	I (:PI-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.	Example 1: Define a core set of security requirements for software components, and include it in acquisition documents, software contracts, and other agreements with third parties. Example 2: Define security-related criteria for selecting software; the criteria can include the third party's vulnerability disclosure program and product security incident response capabilities or the third party's adherence to organization-defined practices. Example 3: Require third parties to attest that their software complies with the organization's security requirements. Example 4: Require third parties to provide provenance data and integrity verification mechanisms for all components of their software. Example 5: Establish and follow processes to address risk when there are security requirements that third-party software components to be acquired do not meet; this should include periodic reviews of all approved exceptions to requirements.
PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time. Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Mechanisms exist to design and	•
PO.1.2	N/A	meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	
PO.2	Implement Roles and Responsibilities	Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Defined Roles & Responsibilities	HRS-03	Mechanisms exist to define cybersecurity roles & responsibilities for all personnel.	
PO.2	Implement Roles and Responsibilities	Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC. Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Competency Requirements for Security-Related Positions	HRS-03.2	Mechanisms exist to ensure that all security-related positions are staffed by qualified individuals who have the necessary skill set. Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of personnel security controls.	Example 1: Define SDLC-related roles and responsibilities for all members of the software development team. Example 2: Integrate the security roles into the software development team. Example 3: Define roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity staff, security champions, project managers and leads, senior management, software developers, software testers, software assurance leads and staff, product owners, operations and platform engineers, and others involved in the SDLC.
PO.2.1	N/A		Functional	Subset Of	Human Resources Security Management	HRS-01		Example 4: Conduct an annual review of all roles and responsibilities. Example 5: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to roles and responsibilities, and confirm that the individuals understand the changes and agree to follow them. Example 6: Implement and use tools and processes to promote communication and engagement among individuals with SDLC-related roles and responsibilities, such as creating messaging channels for team discussions. Example 7: Designate a group of individuals or a team as the code owner for each project.
PO.2.1	N/A	Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Defined Roles & Responsibilities	HRS-03	Mechanisms exist to define cybersecurity roles & responsibilities for all personnel.	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Equal	Role-Based Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Training	SAT-03	Mechanisms exist to provide role-based cybersecurity & data privacy-related training: (1) Before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties; (2) When required by system changes; and (3) Annually thereafter.	Example 1: Document the desired outcomes of training for each role. Example 2: Define the type of training or curriculum required to achieve the desired outcome for each role. Example 3: Create a training plan for each role. Example 4: Acquire or create training for each role; acquired training may need to be customized for the organization. Example 5: Measure outcome performance to identify areas where changes to training may be beneficial.
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Sensitive / Regulated Data Storage, Handling & Processing	SAT-03.3	Mechanisms exist to ensure that every user accessing a system processing, storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling requirements.	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Privileged Users	SAT-03.5	Mechanisms exist to provide specific training for privileged users to ensure privileged users understand their unique roles and responsibilities	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Cyber Threat Environment	SAT-03.6	Mechanisms exist to provide role-based cybersecurity & data privacy awareness training that is current and relevant to the cyber threats that users might encounter in day-to-day business operations.	
PO.2.3	N/A	Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Assigned Cybersecurity & Data Protection Responsibilities	GOV-04	Mechanisms exist to assign one or more qualified individuals with the mission and resources to centrally-manage, coordinate, develop, implement and maintain an enterprise-wide cybersecurity & data protection program.	Example 1: Appoint a single leader or leadership team to be responsible for the entire secure software development process, including being accountable for releasing software to production and delegating responsibilities as appropriate. Example 2: Increase authorizing officials' awareness of the risks of developing software without integrating security throughout the development life cycle and the risk mitigation provided by secure development practices. Example 3: Assist upper management in incorporating secure development support into their communications with personnel with development-related roles and responsibilities. Example 4: Educate all personnel with development-related roles and responsibilities on upper management's commitment to secure development and the importance of secure development to the organization.
PO.2.3	N/A	Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Stakeholder Accountability Structure	GOV-04.1	Mechanisms exist to enforce an accountability structure so that appropriate teams and individuals are empowered, responsible and trained for mapping, measuring and managing data and technology-related risks.	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline. Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs. Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.		Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	



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PO.3		Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.	Functional	Equal	Supporting Toolchain	1	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	- (optional)	
PO.3.1		Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.		Example 1: Define categories of toolchains, and specify the mandatory tools or tool types to be used for each category. Example 2: Identify security tools to integrate into the developer toolchain. Example 3: Define what information is to be passed between tools and what data formats are to be used. Example 4: Evaluate tools' signing capabilities to create immutable records/logs for auditability within the toolchain. Example 5: Use automated technology for toolchain management and orchestration.
PO.3.1	N/A	Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other. Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle. Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.		Example 1: Evaluate, select, and acquire tools, and assess the security of each tool. Example 2: Integrate tools with other tools and existing software development processes and workflows. Example 3: Use code-based configuration for toolchains
PO.3.2	N/A		Functional	Intersects With	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01			(e.g., pipelines-as-code, toolchains-as-code). Example 4: Implement the technologies and processes needed for reproducible builds. Example 5: Update, upgrade, or replace tools as needed to address tool vulnerabilities or add new tool capabilities. Example 6: Continuously monitor tools and tool logs for potential operational and security issues, including policy violations and anomalous behavior. Example 7: Regularly verify the integrity and check the provenance of each tool to identify potential problems. Example 8: See PW.6 regarding compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 9: See PO.5 regarding implementing and maintaining secure environments.
DO 2.2		Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intercepto With	Standardized Operating	ODS 01.1	Mechanisms exist to identify and document Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), or similar		
PO.3.2	N/A		Functional	Intersects With	Procedures (SOP)	OPS-01.1	documentation, to enable the proper execution of day-to-day / assigned tasks.		
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Service Delivery (Business Process Support)	OPS-03	Mechanisms exist to define supporting business processes and implement appropriate governance and service management to ensure appropriate planning, delivery and support of the organization's technology capabilities supporting business functions, workforce, and/or customers based on industry-recognized standards to achieve the specific goals of the process area.		
		Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.					Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software		
PO.3.2	N/A		Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	development processes employ industry- recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.		
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains. Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve		Example 1: Use existing tooling (e.g., workflow tracking,
PO.3.3	N/A	practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.		issue tracking, value stream mapping) to create an audit trail of the secure development-related actions that are performed for continuous improvement purposes. Example 2: Determine how often the collected information should be audited, and implement the necessary processes. Example 3: Establish and enforce security and retention policies for artifact data. Example 4: Assign responsibility for creating any needed artifacts that tools cannot generate.
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization. Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development	Functional	Intersects With	Identification & Justification of Ports, Protocols & Services		Mechanisms exist to require process owners to identify, document and justify the business need for the ports, protocols and other services necessary to operate their technology solutions. Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and	3	
PO.3.3	N/A	practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	distribute administrator documentation for systems that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the system; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative		
PO.3.3		Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties		(e.g., privileged) functions. Mechanisms exist to require software developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within systems, system components or services in sufficient detail to permit analysis and testing of the controls.	3	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review		Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm	5	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	



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PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	(optional) 3	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	3	
PO.4.1	N/A	Define criteria for software security checks and track throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Ensure that the criteria adequately indicate how effectively security risk is being managed. Example 2: Define key performance indicators (KPIs), key risk indicators (KRIs), vulnerability severity scores, and othe measures for software security. Example 3: Add software security criteria to existing checks (e.g., the Definition of Done in agile SDLC methodologies). Example 4: Review the artifacts generated as part of the software development workflow system to determine if they meet the criteria. Example 5: Record security check approvals, rejections, and exception requests as part of the workflow and tracking system. Example 6: Analyze collected data in the context of the security successes and failures of each development project, and use the results to improve the SDLC.
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP)	OPS-01.1	Mechanisms exist to identify and document Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), or similar documentation, to enable the proper execution of day-to-day / assigned tasks.		Example 1: Use the toolchain to automatically gather information that informs security decision-making. Example 2: Deploy additional tools if needed to support the generation and collection of information supporting the criteria. Example 3: Automate decision-making processes utilizing the criteria, and periodically review these processes. Example 4: Only allow authorized personnel to access the gathered information, and prevent any alteration or deletion of the information.
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security		
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	deficiencies. Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.		
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test environments separately from operational baseline configurations to minimize the risk of unintentional changes.		
PO.5	Secure Environments for	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments	TDA-07	Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.		
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production systems.		
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Migration Practices	TDA-08.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure secure migration practices purge systems, applications and services of test/development/staging data and accounts before it is migrated into a production environment.		
PO.5.1	N/A	Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments	TDA-07	Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.		Example 1: Use multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional access for each environment. Example 2: Use network segmentation and access controls to separate the environments from each other and from production environments, and to separate components from each other within each non-production environment, in order to reduce attack surfaces and attackers' lateral movement and privilege/access escalation. Example 3: Enforce authentication and tightly restrict connections entering and exiting each software development environment, including minimizing access to the internet to only what is necessary. Example 4: Minimize direct human access to toolchain systems, such as build services. Continuously monitor and audit all access attempts and all use of privileged access. Example 5: Minimize the use of production-environment software and services from non-production environments. Example 6: Regularly log, monitor, and audit trust relationships for authorization and access between the environments and between the components within each environment. Example 7: Continuously log and monitor operations and alerts across all components of the development environment to detect, respond, and recover from attempted and actual cyber incidents. Example 8: Configure security controls and other tools involved in separating and protecting the environments to generate artifacts for their activities. Example 9: Continuously monitor all software deployed in each environment for new vulnerabilities, and respond to
PO.5.1	N/A	Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production systems.		



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM	STRM	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF)	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
TDL#	T DE Name	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Rationale	Relationship	System Hardening		Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for technology platforms that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.	(optional)	Example 1: Configure each development endpoint based on approved hardening guides, checklists, etc.; for example, enable FIPS-compliant encryption of all sensitive data at rest and in transit. Example 2: Configure each development endpoint and the development resources to provide the least functionality needed by users and services and to enforce the principle of least privilege. Example 3: Continuously monitor the security posture of all development endpoints, including monitoring and auditing
PO.5.2	N/A		Functional	Subset Of	Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02			all use of privileged access. Example 4: Configure security controls and other tools involved in securing and hardening development endpoints to generate artifacts for their activities. Example 5: Require multi-factor authentication for all access to development endpoints and development resources. Example 6: Provide dedicated development endpoints on non-production networks for performing all development-related tasks. Provide separate endpoints on production networks for all other tasks. Example 7: Configure each development endpoint following
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test environments separately from operational baseline configurations to minimize the risk of unintentional changes.		
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Intersects With	Configure Systems, Components or Services for High-Risk Areas	CFG-02.5	Mechanisms exist to configure systems utilized in high-risk areas with more restrictive baseline configurations.		
PS.1	Code from Unauthorized	Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent theft of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Access Restriction For Change	CHG-04	Mechanisms exist to enforce configuration restrictions in an effort to restrict the ability of users to conduct unauthorized changes.		
PS.1		Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent theft of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Library Privileges	CHG-04.5	Mechanisms exist to restrict software library privileges to those individuals with a pertinent business need for access.		
PS.1.1	N/A	Store all forms of code – including source code, executable code, and configuration-as-code – based on the principle of least privilege so that only authorized personnel, tools, services, etc. have access.	Functional	Equal	Access to Program Source Code	TDA-20	Mechanisms exist to limit privileges to change software resident within software libraries.		
PS.2	Provide a Mechanism for Verifying Software Release Integrity	Help software acquirers ensure that the software they acquire is legitimate and has not been tampered with.	Functional	Equal	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software		
PS.2.1	N/A	Make software integrity verification information available to software acquirers.	Functional	Equal	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	releases. Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software releases.		Example 1: Post cryptographic hashes for release files on a well-secured website. Example 2: Use an established certificate authority for code signing so that consumers' operating systems or other tools and services can confirm the validity of signatures before use. Example 3: Periodically review the code signing processes, including certificate renewal, rotation, revocation, and
PS.3	Archive and Protect Each Software Release	Preserve software releases in order to help identify, analyze, and eliminate vulnerabilities discovered in the software after release.	Functional	Equal	Archiving Software Releases	TDA-20.2	Mechanisms exist to archive software releases and all of their components (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) to maintain integrity		protection.
PS.3.1	N/A	Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Functional	Equal	Archiving Software Releases	TDA-20.2	verification information. Mechanisms exist to archive software releases and all of their components (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) to maintain integrity verification information.		Example 1: Store the release files, associated images, etc. in repositories following the organization's established policy. Allow read-only access to them by necessary personnel and no access by anyone else. Example 2: Store and protect release integrity verification information and provenance data, such as by keeping it in a separate location from the release files or by signing the
PS.3.1	N/A	Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Escrow	TDA-20.3	Mechanisms exist to escrow source code and supporting documentation to ensure software availability in the event the software provider goes out of business or is unable to provide support.		data.
PS.3.2	N/A	Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and distribute administrator documentation for systems that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the system; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative		
PS.3.2	N/A	Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	(e.g., privileged) functions. Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses.		
PW.1		Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.		
PW.1		Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Criticality Analysis	TDA-06.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developer of the system, system component or service to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).		
PW.1		Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.		
PW.1		Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications and services.		



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship Notes (optional)
PW.1.1	N/A	Use forms of risk modeling – such as threat modeling, attack modeling, or attack surface mapping – to help assess the security risk for the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.	Example 1: Train the development team (security champions, in particular) or collaborate with a risk modeling expert to create models and analyze how to use a risk-based approach to communicate the risks and determine how to address them, including implementing mitigations. Example 2: Perform more rigorous assessments for highrisk areas, such as protecting sensitive data and safeguarding identification, authentication, and access control, including credential management. Example 3: Review vulnerability reports and statistics for previous software to inform the security risk assessment. Example 4: Use data classification methods to identify and characterize each type of data that the software will interact with.
PW.1.2	N/A	Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	Example 1: Record the response to each risk, including how mitigations are to be achieved and what the rationales are for any approved exceptions to the security requirements. Add any mitigations to the software's security requirements. Example 2: Maintain records of design decisions, risk responses, and approved exceptions that can be used for auditing and maintenance purposes throughout the rest of the software life cycle. Example 3: Periodically re-evaluate all approved exceptions to the security requirements, and implement changes as needed.
PW.1.2	N/A	Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions. Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management,	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are	Example 1: Maintain one or more software repositories of
PW.1.3	N/A	access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP).	services. Example 2: Determine secure configurations for modules for supporting standardized security features and services, and make these configurations available (e.g., as configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use them. Example 3: Define criteria for which security features and services must be supported by software to be developed.
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements		Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP).	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	I 11)A-02 3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Insecure Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.6	Mechanisms exist to mitigate the risk associated with the use of insecure ports, protocols and services necessary to operate technology solutions.	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity & data privacy representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process.	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications and services.	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information		Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	
PW.2.1	N/A	Have 1) a qualified person (or people) who were not involved with the design and/or 2) automated processes instantiated in the toolchain review the software design to confirm and enforce that it meets all of the security requirements and satisfactorily addresses the identified risk information.	Functional	Equal	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	Example 1: Review the software design to confirm that it addresses applicable security requirements. Example 2: Review the risk models created during software design to determine if they appear to adequately identify the risks. Example 3: Review the software design to confirm that it satisfactorily addresses the risks identified by the risk models. Example 4: Have the software's designer correct failures to meet the requirements. Example 5: Change the design and/or the risk response strategy if the security requirements cannot be met. Example 6: Record the findings of design reviews to serve as artifacts (e.g., in the software specification, in the issue tracking system, in the threat model)
PW.4	Feasible Instead of	Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and protocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	THACKING SYSTEM IN THE INTERT MODEL)
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software Wher Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionalit	cryptographic modules and protocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software Wher Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionalit	software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is	Functional	Intersects With	Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) Security Solutions	TDA-03	Mechanisms exist to utilize only Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) security products.	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
PW.4.1		Acquire and maintain well-secured software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, frameworks) from commercial, open-source, and other third-party developers for use by the organization's software.	Functional	Intersects With	Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) Security Solutions		Mechanisms exist to utilize only Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) security products.	(optional)	Example 1: Review and evaluate third-party software components in the context of their expected use. If a component is to be used in a substantially different way in the future, perform the review and evaluation again with that new context in mind. Example 2: Determine secure configurations for software components, and make these available (e.g., as configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use the configurations. Example 3: Obtain provenance information (e.g., SBOM, source composition analysis, binary software composition analysis) for each software component, and analyze that information to better assess the risk that the component may introduce. Example 4: Establish one or more software repositories to host sanctioned and vetted open-source components. Example 5: Maintain a list of organization-approved commercial software components and component versions along with their provenance data. Example 6: Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. Example 7: Implement processes to update deployed software components to newer versions, and retain older versions of software components until all transitions from those versions have been completed successfully. Example 8: If the integrity or provenance of acquired binaries cannot be confirmed, build binaries from source code after verifying the source code's integrity and
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.		Example 1: Follow organization-established security practices for secure software development when creating and maintaining the components. Example 2: Determine secure configurations for software components, and make these available (e.g., as configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use the configurations. Example 3: Maintain one or more software repositories for these components. Example 4: Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. Example 5: Implement processes to update deployed software components to newer versions, and maintain older versions of software components until all transitions from those versions have been completed successfully.
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to produce a design specification and security architecture that: (1) Is consistent with and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's enterprise architecture; (2) Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and (3) Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.		
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.		
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications		
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements		and services. Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP).		Example 1: Regularly check whether there are publicly known vulnerabilities in the software modules and services that vendors have not yet fixed. Example 2: Build into the toolchain automatic detection of known vulnerabilities in software components. Example 3: Use existing results from commercial services for vetting the software modules and services. Example 4: Ensure that each software component is still actively maintained and has not reached end of life; this should include new vulnerabilities found in the software being remediated. Example 5: Determine a plan of action for each software component that is no longer being maintained or will not be available in the near future. Example 6: Confirm the integrity of software components through digital signatures or other mechanisms. Example 7: Review, analyze, and/or test code. See PW.7 and PW.8.
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Ports, Protocols & Services In Use		Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to identify early in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC), the functions, ports, protocols and services intended for use.		
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Identification & Justification of Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.5	Mechanisms exist to require process owners to identify, document and justify the business need for the ports, protocols and other services necessary to operate		
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Insecure Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.6	their technology solutions. Mechanisms exist to mitigate the risk associated with the use of insecure ports, protocols and services necessary to operate technology solutions.		
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)		Mechanisms exist to generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including		
PW.5	T Create Source Code by	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	versions and applicable licenses. Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.		
PW.5		Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.		
PW.5	Adhering to Secure	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.		



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship Notes (optional)
PW.5.1		Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	Example 1: Validate all inputs, and validate and properly encode all outputs. Example 2: Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. Example 3: Detect errors, and handle them gracefully. Example 4: Provide logging and tracing capabilities. Example 5: Use development environments with automated features that encourage or require the use of secure coding practices with just-in-time training-in-place. Example 6: Follow procedures for manually ensuring compliance with secure coding practices when automated methods are insufficient or unavailable. Example 7: Use tools (e.g., linters, formatters) to standardize the style and formatting of the source code. Example 8: Check for other vulnerabilities that are common to the development languages and environment. Example 9: Have the developer review their own human-readable code to complement (not replace) code review performed by other people or tools. See PW.7.
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements. Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors /	
PW.5.1	N/A	environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	ı	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	
PW.6	Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development		Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	
PW.6	Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce	
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02 3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	Example 1: Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 2: Follow change management processes when deploying or updating compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Example 3: Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. See PO.3.
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.	Example 1: Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 2: Follow change management processes when deploying or updating compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Example 3: Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. See PO.3.
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	
PW.6.2		Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.	Example 1: Enable compiler features that produce warnings for poorly secured code during the compilation process. Example 2: Implement the "clean build" concept, where all compiler warnings are treated as errors and eliminated except those determined to be false positives or irrelevant. Example 3: Perform all builds in a dedicated, highly controlled build environment. Example 4: Enable compiler features that randomize or obfuscate execution characteristics, such as memory location usage, that would otherwise be predictable and thus potentially exploitable. Example 5: Test to ensure that the features are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any operational issues or other problems. Example 6: Continuously verify that the approved configurations are being used. Example 7: Make the approved tool configurations available as configuration-as-code so developers can readily use them.
PW.6.2		Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	1	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.	
PW.6.2		Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	(optional)	
PW.7	Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.		
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis		Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system		
PW.7	Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Malformed Input Testing	TDA-09.4	Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure systems, services and products continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.		
PW.7	Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Application Penetration Testing	TDA-09.5	Mechanisms exist to perform application- level penetration testing of custom-made applications and services.		
PW.7.1	N/A	Determine whether code review (a person looks directly at the code to find issues) and/or code analysis (tools are used to find issues in code, either in a fully automated way or in conjunction with a person) should be used, as defined by the organization.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code review should be performed and how it should be conducted. This may include third-party code and reusable code modules written in-house. Example 2: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code analysis should be performed and how it should be conducted. Example 3: Choose code review and/or analysis methods based on the stage of the software.
PW.7.2	N/A	Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.		Example 1: Perform peer review of code, and review any existing code review, analysis, or testing results as part of the peer review. Example 2: Use expert reviewers to check code for backdoors and other malicious content. Example 3: Use peer reviewing tools that facilitate the peer review process, and document all discussions and other feedback. Example 4: Use a static analysis tool to automatically check code for vulnerabilities and compliance with the organization's secure coding standards with a human reviewing the issues reported by the tool and remediating them as necessary. Example 5: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements. Example 6: Use automated tools to identify and remediate documented and verified unsafe software practices on a continuous basis as human-readable code is checked into the code repository. Example 7: Identify and document the root causes of discovered issues. Example 8: Document lessons learned from code review and analysis in a wiki that developers can access and
PW.7.2	N/A	Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis		Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.		acarah
PW.8	Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.	Functional	Intersects With	Malformed Input Testing	TDA-09.4	Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure systems, services and products continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.		
PW.8	Identify Vulnerabilities	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.	Functional	Intersects With	Application Penetration Testing	TDA-09.5	Mechanisms exist to perform application- level penetration testing of custom-made applications and services.		
PW.8.1	N/A	Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.		Example 1: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code testing should be performed and how it should be conducted (e.g., within a sandboxed environment). This may include third-party executable code and reusable executable code modules written in-house. Example 2: Choose testing methods based on the stage of the software.
PW.8.1	N/A	Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship Notes (optional)
PW.8.2	N/A	Scope the testing, design the tests, perform the testing, and document the results, including recording and triaging all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	Example 1: Perform robust functional testing of security features. Example 2: Integrate dynamic vulnerability testing into the project's automated test suite. Example 3: Incorporate tests for previously reported vulnerabilities into the project's test suite to ensure that errors are not reintroduced. Example 4: Take into consideration the infrastructures and technology stacks that the software will be used with in production when developing test plans. Example 5: Use fuzz testing tools to find issues with input handling. Example 6: If resources are available, use penetration testing to simulate how an attacker might attempt to compromise the software in high-risk scenarios. Example 7: Identify and record the root causes of discovered issues. Example 8: Document lessons learned from code testing in a wiki that developers can access and search. Example 9: Use source code, design records, and other
PW.9	Configure Software to Have Secure Settings by Default	Help improve the security of the software at the time of installation to reduce the likelihood of the software being deployed with weak security settings, putting it at greater risk of compromise.	Functional	Equal	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	resources when developing test plans
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Equal	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for technology platforms that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.	Example 1: Conduct testing to ensure that the settings, including the default settings, are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any security weaknesses, operational issues, or other problems.
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services. Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade. Mechanisms exist to implement secure	
PW.9.1	N/A	security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP).	Example 2: Document each setting's purpose, options, default value, security relevance, potential operational impact, and relationships with other settings. Example 3: Use authoritative programmatic technical mechanisms to record how each setting can be implemented and assessed by software administrators. Example 4: Store the default configuration in a usable format and follow change control practices for modifying it
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	(e.g., configuration-as-code).
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	and/or functionality change control review process.	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers. Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential	Functional	Intersects With	Continuous Monitoring Plan	TDA-09.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of cybersecurity & data privacy control effectiveness. Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and	Example 1: Monitor vulnerability databases , security mailing
RV.1.1	N/A	vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	distribute administrator documentation for systems that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the system; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (e.g., privileged) functions.	lists, and other sources of vulnerability reports through manual or automated means. Example 2: Use threat intelligence sources to better understand how vulnerabilities in general are being exploited. Example 3: Automatically review provenance and software composition data for all software components to identify any new vulnerabilities they have.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship	Notes (optional)
RV.1.1		Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties	TDA-04.1	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within systems, system components or services in sufficient detail to permit analysis and	(optional)	
RV.1.1		Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)		testing of the controls. Mechanisms exist to generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses.		
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to produce a design specification and security architecture that: (1) Is consistent with and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's enterprise architecture; (2) Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and (3) Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.		
RV.1.2		Review, analyze, and/or test the software's code to identify or confirm the presence of previously undetected vulnerabilities.	Functional	Subset Of	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.		Example 1: Configure the toolchain to perform automated code analysis and testing on a regular or continuous basis for all supported releases. Example 2: See PW.7 and PW.8.
RV.1.3	N/A	Have a policy that addresses vulnerability disclosure and remediation, and implement the roles, responsibilities, and processes needed to support that policy.	Functional	Equal	Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP)		Mechanisms exist to establish a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) to assist with the secure development and maintenance of products and services that receives unsolicited input from the public about vulnerabilities in organizational systems, services and processes.		Example 1: Establish a vulnerability disclosure program, and make it easy for security researchers to learn about your program and report possible vulnerabilities. Example 2: Have a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) and processes in place to handle the responses to vulnerability reports and incidents, including communications plans for all stakeholders. Example 3: Have a security response playbook to handle a generic reported vulnerability, a report of zero-days, a vulnerability being exploited in the wild, and a major ongoing incident involving multiple parties and open-source software components. Example 4: Periodically conduct exercises of the product security incident response processes
RV.2		Help ensure that vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	1	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.		
RV.2		Help ensure that vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development		Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		
RV.2.1		Analyze each vulnerability to gather sufficient information about risk to plan its remediation or other risk response.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development		Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Use existing issue tracking software to record each vulnerability. Example 2: Perform risk calculations for each vulnerability based on estimates of its exploitability, the potential impact if exploited, and any other relevant characteristics.
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management		Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.		Example 1: Make a risk-based decision as to whether each vulnerability will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through other means (e.g., risk acceptance, risk transference), and prioritize any actions to be taken. Example 2: If a permanent mitigation for a vulnerability is not yet available, determine how the vulnerability can be temporarily mitigated until the permanent solution is available, and add that temporary remediation to the plan. Example 3: Develop and release security advisories that provide the necessary information to software acquirers, including descriptions of what the vulnerabilities are, how to find instances of the vulnerable software, and how to address them (e.g., where to get patches and what the patches change in the software; what configuration settings may need to be changed; how temporary workarounds could be implemented). Example 4: Deliver remediations to acquirers via an automated and trusted delivery mechanism. A single remediation could address multiple vulnerabilities. Example 5: Update records of design decisions, risk responses, and approved exceptions as needed. See PW.1.2.
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	1	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.		



			STRM	STRM			Secure Controls Framework (SCF)	Strength of	
FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	Rationale	Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Control Description	Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Vulnerability Remediation Process	VPM-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure that vulnerabilities are properly identified, tracked and remediated.		
RV.3	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Cause	Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.		
RV.3	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Cause		Functional	Intersects With	Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned	IRO-13	Mechanisms exist to incorporate lessons learned from analyzing and resolving cybersecurity & data privacy incidents to reduce the likelihood or impact of future incidents.		
RV.3.1	N/A	Analyze identified vulnerabilities to determine their root causes.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Record the root cause of discovered issues. Example 2: Record lessons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search.
RV.3.2		Analyze the root causes over time to identify patterns, such as a particular secure coding practice not being followed consistently.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Record lessons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search. Example 2: Add mechanisms to the toolchain to automatically detect future instances of the root cause. Example 3: Update manual processes to detect future instances of the root cause.
RV.3.3		Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security		Example 1: See PW.7 and PW.8.
RV.3.3		Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	deficiencies. Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.		Example 1: Record lessons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search. Example 2: Plan and implement changes to the appropriate SDLC practices.
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct security deficiencies.		
RV.3.4		Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity & data privacy representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process.		
RV.3.4		Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on secure coding principles.		



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