Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM)



Reference Document : Secure Controls Framework (SCF) version 2024.4

Focal Document: CISA Secure Software Development Attestation Form

Focal Document Source: https://www.cisa.gov/secure-software-attestation-form

STRM URL: https://securecontrolsframework.com/content/strm/scf-strm-cisa-ssdaf.pdf

Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM) is well-suited for mapping between sets of elements that exist in two distinct concepts that are mostly the same as each other (e.g., cybersecurity & data privacy requirements). STRM also allows the strength of the mapping to be captured.


STRM relies on a justification for the relationship claim. There are three (3) options for the rationale, which is a high-level context within which the two concepts are related:

1. Syntactic: How similar is the wording that expresses the two concepts? This is a word-for-word analysis of the relationship, not an interpretation of the language.

2. Semantic: How similar are the meanings of the two concepts? This involves some interpretation of each concept's language.

3. Functional: How similar are the results of executing the two concepts? This involves understanding what will happen if the two concepts are implemented, performed, or otherwise executed.

Based on NIST IR 8477, STRM supports five (5) five relationship types to describe the logical similarity between two distinct concepts:



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FDE #	Related EO 14028 Section	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF #	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
		The software is developed and built in secure environments. Those environments are secured by the following actions at a minimum:	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test environments separately from operational baseline configurations to minimize the risk	5	
4	4e(i) 4e(i)(A)	Separating and protecting each environment involved in developing and building software;	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments		Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.	10	
1			Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Secure Migration Practices	TDA-08.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure secure migration practices purge systems, applications and services of test/development/staging data and	3	
1.a			Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments		Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.	10	Example 1: Use multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional access for each environment. Example 2: Use network segmentation and access controls to separate the environments from each other and from
1.0			Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the		Example 1: Use multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional access for each environment. Example 2: Use network segmentation and access controls to separate the environments from each other and from
		Regularly logging monitoring and auditing trust relationships used for authorization and access:	Functional	Subset Of	Continuous Monitoring	MON-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls.	10	
1.b.	4e(i)(B)		Functional	Intersects With	Content of Event Logs	MON-03	Mechanisms exist to configure systems to produce event logs that contain sufficient information to, at a minimum: (1) Establish what type of event occurred;	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Audit Trails	MON-03.2	Mechanisms exist to link system access to individual users or service accounts.	5	
1.b.i	4e(i)(B)	to any software development and build environments; and	Functional	Intersects With	Inbound & Outbound Communications Traffic	MON-01.3	Mechanisms exist to continuously monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	System-Wide / Time- Correlated Audit Trail	MON-02.7	Automated mechanisms exist to compile audit records into an organization-wide audit trail that is time-correlated.	5	
1.b.ii	4e(i)(B)	among components within each environment;	Functional	Intersects With	System Generated Alerts	MON-01.4	Mechanisms exist to generate, monitor, correlate and respond to alerts from physical, cybersecurity, data privacy and supply chain activities to achieve integrated cituational awarmars Automated mechanisms exist to compile	5	
		Enforcing multi-factor authentication and conditional access across the environments	Functional	Intersects With	System-Wide / Time- Correlated Audit Trail	MON-02.7	audit records into an organization-wide audit trail that is time-correlated. Automated mechanisms exist to enforce	5	
1.c	4e(i)(C)	relevant to developing and building software in a manner that minimizes security risk; Taking consistent and reasonable steps to document as well as minimize use or inclusion of	Functional	Equal	Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)	IAC-06	Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for: (1) Remote network access; (2) Third-party systems, applications and/or Mechanisms exist to facilitate the	10	
	4e(i)(D)	software;	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique buciness poods Mechanisms exist to design and implement	10	
			Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and correct cocurity deficiencies Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Mechanisms exist to require the developers	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Ports, Protocols & Services In Use	TDA-02.1	of systems, system components or services to identify early in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC), the functions, ports, protocols and corvices intended for use Mechanisms exist to require software	5	
1.d			Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties	TDA-04.1	developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within curtoms curtom components or convisos in Mechanisms exist to require the developers	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	of systems, system components or services to produce a design specification and security architecture that: (1) Is consistent with and supportive of the Mechanisms exist to implement secure	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the accept at a groater rick of compromice Mechanisms exist to require the developer	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Criticality Analysis	TDA-06.1	of the system, system component or service to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Mechanisms exist to perform threat	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software	5	
		Encrypting sensitive data such as credentials to the extent practicable and based on risk;	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications and convices Mechanisms exist to facilitate the	3	
	4e(i)(E)		Functional	Subset Of	Use of Cryptographic Controls	CRY-01	implementation of cryptographic protections controls using known public standards and trusted cryptographic technologies Mechanisms exist to ensure risk-based	10	
1.e			Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	technical and functional specifications are established to define a Minimum Viable Product (MVP). Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors /	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure	8	

						configuration implemented; and		
						Mechanisms exist to develop applications		
						based on secure coding principles.		
		Functional	Intersects With	Secure Coding	TDA-06		8	



Secure Controls Framework (SCF)

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FDE #	Related EO 14028 Section	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF #	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
		Implementing defensive cybersecurity practices including continuous monitoring of operations and alerts and as necessary responding to suspected and confirmed cyber incidents;	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Protection Governance Program		Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity & data protection governance controls.	10	
	4e(i)(F)		Functional	Intersects With	Operationalizing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Practices	GOV-15	Mechanisms exist to compel data and/or process owners to operationalize cybersecurity & data privacy practices for each system, application and/or service	5	
1.f			Functional	Subset Of	Continuous Monitoring	MON-01	under their control. Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls.	10	
			Functional	Subset Of	Incident Response Operations	IRO-01	Mechanisms exist to implement and govern processes and documentation to facilitate an organization-wide response capability for cybersecurity & data privacy-related		
		The software producer makes a goodfaith effort to maintain trusted source code supply chains by employing automated tools or comparable processes to address the security of internal code and third-party components and manage related vulnerabilities;	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	incidents. Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to update products, including systems, software and services, to improve functionality and	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes		Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry- recognized secure practices for secure	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including versions	3	
			Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications	3	
2	4e(iii)		Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	8	
			Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Test	3	
			Functional	Intersects With	Software / Firmware Integrity Verification	TDA-14.1	Mechanisms exist to require developer of systems, system components or services to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.	3	
			Functional	Intersects With	Developer Threat Analysis & Flaw Remediation	TDA-15	Mechanisms exist to require system developers and integrators to create a Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) plan and implement the plan under the witness of an	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Access to Program Source Code		Mechanisms exist to limit privileges to change software resident within software libraries.	5	
	4e(vi)	The software producer maintains provenance for internal code and third-party components incorporated into the software to the greatest extent feasible;	Functional	Intersects With	Access to Program Source Code		Mechanisms exist to limit privileges to change software resident within software libraries.	5	
3			Functional	Intersects With	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software releases.	5	
			Functional	Intersects With	Software Escrow	TDA-20.3	Mechanisms exist to escrow source code and supporting documentation to ensure software availability in the event the software provider goes out of business or is	5	
		The software producer employed automated tools or comparable processes that check for security vulnerabilities. In addition:	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Test	8	
4	4e(iv)		Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and	3	
			Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and	3	
	4e(iv)	The software producer operates these processes on an ongoing basis and prior to product version or update releases;	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Test	8	
4.a			Functional	Intersects With	Developer Threat Analysis & Flaw Remediation	TDA-15	Mechanisms exist to require system developers and integrators to develop and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan to objectively identify and	8	
	4e(iv)	The software producer has a policy or process to address discovered security vulnerabilities prior to product release; and	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique	10	
4.b			Functional	Subset Of	Vulnerability & Patch Management Program (VPMP)		Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of vulnerability management controls.	10	
			Functional	Intersects With	Vulnerability Remediation Process		Mechanisms exist to ensure that vulnerabilities are properly identified, tracked and remediated.	8	
	4e(iv)	The software producer operates a vulnerability disclosure program and accepts reviews and addresses disclosed software vulnerabilities in a timely fashion and according to any timelines specified in the vulnerability disclosure program or applicable policies.	Functional	Subset Of	Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP)	THR-06	Mechanisms exist to establish a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) to assist with the secure development and maintenance of products and services that	10	
4.c			Functional	Intersects With	Vulnerability Remediation Process		Mechanisms exist to ensure that vulnerabilities are properly identified, tracked and remediated.	8	



Secure Controls Framework (SCF)